FREE LUNCH OR CHEAP FIX?:
THE EMISSIONS TRADING IDEA AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION

David M. Driesen 1

Emissions trading has become a key component of U.S. environmental legal regimes. The U.S. has successfully
lobbied to make international environmental benefit trading, an expanded form of emissions trading, a part of
international efforts to address the threat of global climate change through the Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Kyoto Protocol to that Convention. Legal Scholars have lauded emissions trading, as a "free
lunch" that will encourage innovation, enhance democratic accountability, and reduce the cost of environmental
cleanup. This article argues that emissions trading functions as a cheap fix, reducing short-term costs while
tending to lessen innovation and thwart democratic accountability. Because of this, emissions trading will
ultimately weaken efforts to address complex environmental problems, unless policymakers carefully limit trading
programs to make sure that they do not undermine innovation and democratic accountability. The author
recommends specific limits to international emissions trading designed to avoid undermining the long-term
efficacy of the climate change regime.
[P]arsimony is not economy. It is separable in theory from it; and in fact it may or it may not be a part of
economy, according to circumstances. Expense, and great expense, may be an essential part in true economy. If
parsimony were to be considered as one of the kinds of that virtue, there is, however, another and a higher
economy. Economy is a distributive virtue, and consists, not in saving, but in selection. Parsimony requires no
providence, no sagacity, no powers of combination, no comparison, no judgment. Mere instinct, and that not an
instinct of the noblest kind, may produce this false economy in perfection. The other economy has larger views. It
demands a discriminating judgment, and a firm, sagacious mind.
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Edmund Burke2

INTRODUCTION
When the roof leaks, a homeowner must decide whether to patch the roof or replace it. The homeowner
recognizes that this decision involves a choice between a cheap fix and a solution with more short-term costs and
more long-term benefit.
The decision to patch the roof may address today's leak more cheaply than replacing the roof. But the wise
homeowner does not regard this "least-cost" solution as something she should accept as readily as, say, a "free
lunch" to which there is no discernible downside. The homeowner at least considers whether a more expensive
solution, replacing the roof, may work better in the long run.
Nations often face a similar choice between cheap fixes and more enduring solutions to societal problems
when they create new law. However, policy makers and scholars may either fail to perceive the existence of this
choice or fail to think about it carefully. Any solution that promises to meet a short-term policy goal with fairly low
immediate costs may seem like a "free lunch."
This article focuses on a very serious problem facing the international community, global climate change,
and a very important idea in environmental policy, achieving environmental goals more cheaply through emissions
trading.3 Emissions trading programs allow polluters to forego otherwise required pollution reductions at regulated

2.A Letter to a Noble Lord (1795), in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES-EDMUND BURKE, at 564END65
(Peter J. Stanlis ed.) (1968).
3.See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary,
18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451, 453 (1993) (predicted rise in temperature "could have severe effects on coastal
areas, agriculture, forests, and human health"); Dr. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, Can International Law
Improve the Climate? An Analysis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Signed at the Rio Summit in 1992, 18 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 491, 493END500 (1993);
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), THE REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITIES (Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter IPCC REGIONAL
IMPACTS]; IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 6 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds.,
1996) [hereinafter IPCC 1995 SCIENCE]; David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive
Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
289, 291END92 (1998) (describing the importance of emissions trading in environmental policy); Royal C.
Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 IOWA L. REV. 527
(1996) (arguing that trading offers a way of avoiding takings claims while continuing to regulate wetlands);
Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old
Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991) (discussing factors explaining increased use of emissions trading); Robert
W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading
Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989); Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is
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pollution sources if they produce or purchase equivalent reductions made elsewhere.4 Since a polluter will only
choose to purchase a reduction elsewhere when doing so saves money, emissions trading tends to reduce private
sector compliance costs. Recognizing this, some very prominent scholars have analogized emissions trading to a
"free lunch" and this analogy has influenced many policy makers.5
The United States has made international emissions trading a centerpiece of its climate change policy. 6
Trading issues commanded the attention of delegates to the recent Kyoto conference on climate change, and they
promise to play an important role in the future evolution of international law addressing climate change.7
This article argues that the cheap fix metaphor describes emissions trading better than the free lunch
metaphor that some scholars have applied to it. The "free lunch" metaphor captures emissions trading's theoretical
capacity to meet a short-term goal at less cost than traditional regulation. But emissions trading, and
environmental benefit trading generally, may increase the risk of long-term environmental damage. For example,
trading may facilitate avoidance of initially expensive or difficult investments in innovative technology. Avoidance
of innovation may raise long-term costs and make future progress more difficult. The cheap fix metaphor captures
significant problems with emissions trading that have received relatively little attention.

this Thoroughbred Hobbled, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217 (1988).
4.See Driesen, supra note 2, at 290.
5.See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for
Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 172 (1988); THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN
TRANSITION: TOWARD A MORE DESIRABLE FUTURE 39END40 (1998) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL
TRANSITION] (reflecting a policy consensus of various government officials, industry representatives, and
academics that emissions trading programs "hold great promise as cost-effective methods for achieving
environmental goals and encouraging technological innovation"). Nevertheless, most responsible analysts
and policy-makers realize that emissions trading poses complex design issues and is not a good tool for all
problems. See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 2, at 309, 329 & n.186; WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E.
OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 190 (2d ed. 1988) (claiming that the ideal policy requires
a mix of trading and other approaches); J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES 98 (1968) (pointing
out that emissions trading is impracticable for "diffuse" pollution); ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSITION, supra
note 4, at 39END40.
6.See James H. Searles, Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 21 Int'l. Env't. Rep. (BNA) 131, 133 (Feb. 4, 1998) (U.S. has demanded emissions trading in
exchange for legally binding emissions reductions); Tanya L. Forsheit, International Emissions Trading:
Equity Issues in the Search for Market-Based Solutions to Global Environmental Degradation, 18 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 689, 704 (1997).
7.Searles, supra note 5, at 132END33; Kyoto Protocol Opens for Signature As Officials Face Talks on New
Issues, 21 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 246 (March 18, 1998) (joint implementation and emissions trading at
core of agenda for Buenos Aires conference in November).
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Decisions about whether to adopt legal cheap fixes involve analogues to the economic and budgetary
considerations a homeowner faces in deciding whether to replace or repair a leaky roof. Writing law, however,
involves more than just financial calculations. Law helps shape norms8 and political expectations that help a
community to function effectively over the long-term.9 The need to shape norms capable of uniting a community to
address difficult problems often makes short-term fixes less desirable for a society than for a stable homeowner.
For cheap fixes may disregard important norms and values. Yet government officials may have even more reasons
to choose cheap fixes than the heads of stable households. This suggests that scholars should make understanding
cheap fix problems a central focus of their work, especially when they write about treaty regimes and legislation.
Part I of this article explains key features of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (Framework Convention or Convention),10 the Kyoto Protocol to that Convention,11 and emissions trading.
The Framework Convention contains two potentially conflicting principles relevant to emissions trading, the
principle that developed countries should provide leadership in addressing climate change (the leadership
principle), and the cost effectiveness principle.12 Part I explains the "free lunch" theory of emissions trading and

8.See FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND
LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS (1989); Audie Klotz, Norms
Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa, 49 INT'L ORG.
451 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV.
338 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); Carol M. Rose,
Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 36
("We need to pay attention to the lessons we provide for ourselves through our laws."); cf. ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
9.See, e.g., Klotz, supra note 7, at 451 (describing how a norm of racial equality helped transform
politically defined interests in South Africa). See generally LYNNE M. JURGIELEWICZ, GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THE LEGAL ORDER
100END16 (1996) (discussing the role of norms and expectations in establishing international regimes);
Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating
the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1647 (1996) (norms arise to coordinate the interaction of
people in a community).
10.Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate
Change on the Work of the Second Part of its Fifth Session, U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, 5th Sess. pt. 2, Annex I, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.237/18 (1992) (Part II)/Add. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter Framework Convention].
11.Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Third Session, Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 3rd Sess., pt. 2, Annex I, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/add.1, reprinted
without certain technical corrections in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
12.Generally speaking, this article uses the term "developed countries" to refer to those countries listed in
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trading's role in the Climate Change Convention (i.e., the Framework Convention with the Kyoto Protocol to that
Convention).
Part II of this article examines emissions trading's likely impact on the long-term development of the
Climate Change Convention. The Framework Convention's leadership principle may require developed countries
to create and apply advanced technology reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Unfortunately, a broad trading
program may help avoid that investment. Part II discusses how innovation avoidance may affect long-term efforts
to address climate change. This part also discusses how emissions trading may interfere with the democratic
accountability needed to make any international environmental legal regime effective over the long-term.13 It
argues that a "cheap fix" theory of emissions trading calls much needed attention to potential long-term problems
with emissions trading that the "free lunch" theory neglects.
Part III discusses the general problem of how scholars should think about the desirability of cheap fixes. It
recommends that legal scholars identify the competing values at stake in the choice of whether to use a cheap fix to
address environmental and social problems. This analysis should include consideration of the role law plays in
defining norms for the society and helping a community remain cohesive enough to address important problems in
the future. Finally, this part recommends limiting this experiment in international trading to capture some of
trading's cheap fix benefits without damaging the long-term international effort to effectively address climate
change and other international environmental problems.

I. THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION AND THE EMISSIONS TRADING IDEA

This part will discuss the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the recent Kyoto Protocol to the
Framework Convention, and emissions trading. This discussion will provide a basic understanding of the "free
lunch" theory of trading and the law governing trading under the Climate Change Convention.

Annex I to the Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Framework Convention, supra note 9,
Annex I, 31 I.L.M. at 872. These countries include the European countries, Japan, Canada, Australia, the
United States, and the former Soviet Union.
13.See, e.g., David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability, and Partnership: A Model for Advocacy on Third
World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645, 2653END55 (1991) (discussing accountability problems at
the World Bank).
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A.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
This discussion of the Framework Convention begins with an explanation of the principal problems its

drafters sought to address. This part then describes the Framework Convention itself, emphasizing the major
principles relevant to evaluating emissions trading.

1. Equitable and Practical Problems
Greenhouse gases, such as water vapor, carbon dioxide, nitrous oxides, and methane, tend to warm the
earth's atmosphere.14 Since the dawn of the industrial age, anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases have
caused a significant rise in global mean surface temperatures and scientists expect these gases to cause greater
increases in the future.15 Burning fossil fuels creates greenhouse gas emissions, so serious efforts to combat climate
change may involve less reliance upon fossil fuels.16 Some terrestrial ecosystems (such as forests) and the oceans
tend to sequester carbon emissions, acting as "carbon sinks."17 Carbon sinks effectively reduce atmospheric

14.See IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 59END60. The World Meteorological Association and the
United Nations Environmental Program have established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). G.O.P. OBASI & HS. E. DOWDESWELL, Foreword to IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at vii.
Thousands of scientists in more than 150 countries participate in IPCC assessments. The 1995 report, for
example, reflects the work of more than 500 scientists as either authors, contributors, or reviewers. ROBERT
BOLIN ET AL., Preface in IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at xi. This article relies principally on the
consensus views of this large number of scientists as reflected in the IPCC reports.
15.IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 3END7.
16.Winfried Lang, Is the Ozone Depletion Regime a Model for an Emerging Regime on Global Warming?,
9 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 161, 161 (1991) (progress on global warming depends upon meeting the
rising needs of developing countries without reliance upon fossil fuel combustion). See IPCC, CLIMATE
CHANGE 1995: IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS AND MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL
ANALYSES 14END16 (Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter IPCC IMPACTS] (discussing reducing
greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel and switching to non-fossil energy sources); IPCC, CLIMATE
CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 11 (James P. Bruce et al. eds.,
1996) [hereinafter IPCC DIMENSIONS] (discussing energy efficiency improvements, fuel switching). In
1990, fossil fuel consumption accounted for 70% to 90% of all anthropogenic sources of carbon dioxide.
IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 84. Fossil fuel combustion is "the primary source of the greenhouse
effect." Jennifer Woodward, Turning Down the Heat: What United States Laws Can Do to Help Ease
Global Warming, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 208 (1989).
17.See IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 61, 449; John H. Cushman, Scientists are Turning to Trees to
Repair the Greenhouse, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1998 at F4.
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concentrations of carbon, because they absorb more carbon from the atmosphere than they release.18 Hence, efforts
to conserve and enhance forests help ameliorate climate change.19 Conversely, burning forests exacerbates climate
change by releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.20
Climate change in turn may increase the frequency of floods, droughts, and other natural disasters, spread
infectious diseases, and disrupt ecosystems.21 Warming may melt ice sheets and raise sea levels, causing
inundation of low lying coastal areas.22
In 1992, representatives of more than 140 countries gathered in Rio de Janeiro to address the climate
change problem. The delegates to this "Earth Summit," the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, faced a formidable challenge, because so many important activities contribute to climate change. 23
Electricity generation, industrial production, transportation, timber harvesting, and land use decisions all play
significant roles.24
The delegates also faced a serious equitable problem that frequently arises in international environmental

18.Joy E. Hect & Brett Orlando, Can the Kyoto Protocol Support Biodiversity Conservation? Legal and
Financial Challenges, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10508, 10509 (1998).
19.See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 11 (discussing "forestry options"); IPCC IMPACTS, supra note
15, at 775END97 (evaluating forest management strategies for mitigating climate change); Richard A.
Houghton & George M. Woodwell, Forests as Carbon Sinks, in CRITERIA FOR JOINT IMPLEMENTATION
UNDER THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 35END40 (Kilaparti Ramakrishna ed. 1994)
[hereinafter CRITERIA] (discussing the implications of continued deforestation, halting deforestation, net
reforestation and substituting wood fuels for fossil fuels).
20.See IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 449; Woodward, supra note 15 at 208END10.
21.IPCC REGIONAL IMPACTS, supra note 2, at 2END6; see Robert L. Fischman, Global Warming and
Property Interests: Preserving Coastal Wetlands as Sea Levels Rise, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 565, 565 (1991)
(discussing climate change's potential threats to coastal wetlands).
22.See IPCC REGIONAL IMPACTS, supra note 2, at 5, 7, 9END15; IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note, 2 at 6;
LYNNE T. EDGERTON, THE RISING TIDE: GLOBAL WARMING AND WORLD SEA LEVELS (1991). This poses an
especially severe problem for small island states. See William C. Burns, Global WarmingEMDThe United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICK. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 147 (1997).
23.Martin J. LaLonde, The Role of Risk Analysis in the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change,
15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 215, 217 (1993). See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, Annex A, 37 I.L.M. at 42 (listing
sources of emissions).
24.See IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 21, 39END51; W. NEIL ADGER & KATRINA BROWN, LAND USE AND
THE CAUSES OF GLOBAL WARMING (1994). See, e.g., European Commission Outlines Strategy to Cut CO2
Emissions From Transportation, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2679 (April 17, 1998).
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law. Developing countries usually have very limited resources to address environmental problems that require
global efforts.25 Furthermore, developed countries often have made disproportionate contributions to global
pollution problems. Creators of international environmental treaties must craft obligations that adequately address
the environmental problem at hand, yet avoid imposing an unfair burden upon developing countries.26
Developed countries, especially the United States, played a leading role in creating the climate change
problem, primarily by burning large amounts of fossil fuels.27 Industrialized countries contain just 20% of the
world's population, yet they generate approximately 65% of present global emissions. These developed countries
were responsible for producing 73% of cumulative emissions between 1950 and 1995.28 The United States has the
highest per capita carbon dioxide emission rate in the world29 and alone accounts for about one quarter of the
world's fossil carbon emissions.30
But the developed countries probably cannot solve this problem alone.31 A number of underdeveloped
countries are growing rapidly and increasing their own greenhouse gas emissions at prodigious rates.32 If large
developing countries (such as China, India and Brazil), emulate America's inefficient technology33 as they grow

25.This article uses the term developing countries to refer to those countries not listed in Annex I of the
Framework Convention. See Framework Convention, supra note 9, Annex I, 31 I.L.M. at 872.
26.See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of
a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675, 705 (1993) (citing issues of responsibility for harm to global
resources as the most controversial equitable issues in the international community).
27.See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 94 (describing historic carbon dioxide and methane
contributions by region and discussing fossil fuel burning as source of emissions).
28.DUNCAN AUSTIN, CLIMATE PROTECTION POLICY: CAN WE AFFORD TO DELAY 17 (1997). The figures for
cumulative emissions matter, because past emissions remain in the atmosphere and contribute to present
and future warming trends. See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 93 (noting contribution of past
emissions to current atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases). Hence, developed countries' past
contributions remain relevant to the equities in distributing reduction obligations going forward.
These differentials in emissions reflect differentials in consumption. "About 25% of the world's
populations consume almost 80% of the global energy." IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 82END83. Since
1860, less than 20% of the cumulative global population has consumed 85% of all energy used. Id. at 83.
29.IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 95.
30.Id. at 95.
31.Id. at 97.
32.See IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 657END68.
33.The United States emits more carbon per unit of gross national product (GNP) than any country in the
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economically, their greenhouse gas emissions will probably surpass developed country greenhouse gas emissions
within a few decades.34

2. A Framework of Principles and Goals
The delegates to the 1992 Earth Summit failed to agree upon ambitious and specific legally binding
obligations to reduce greenhouse emissions and limit rainforest destruction. Instead, they adopted a "framework
convention," which established objectives, principles, and a set of unambitious, and sometimes vague,
obligations.35 The adoption of an initial framework convention has become a common means of beginning
international legal efforts to solve environmental problems.36 For example, efforts to address depletion of the
stratospheric ozone layer and transboundary air pollution in Europe began with framework conventions.37 In these
two cases, and in some other cases as well, agreement to substantive measures came later, often in the form of
protocols to the framework convention.38 In other cases, subsequent obligations never became more concrete and

world except China if GNP is measured in purchasing power parity exchange rates. See IPCC DIMENSIONS,
supra note 15, at 96. U.S. carbon emissions per unit of GNP remain among the highest in the world if
measured in U.S. dollars at market exchange rates. Id.
34.Even if one assumes fairly modest growth in developing country carbon dioxide emissions, developed
countries' fossil fuels carbon dioxide emissions will equal those of the OECD countries by 2020. IPCC
DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 97.
35.See Framework Convention, supra note 9.
36.See Weiss, supra note 24 at 687END88; Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1484, 1542END46 (1991) [hereinafter Developments] (evaluating the framework-protocol
approach and predicting that it may not adequately address global warming).
37.See United Nations: Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M.
1516 (framework convention was established to address ozone depletion); Convention on Long Range
Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1442; Lang, supra note 15, at 164END67 (discussing
evolution of ozone regime and long-range transboundary air pollution regime).
38.See JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 186 (the Vienna Convention established a "general obligation" to
protect the ozone layer and the subsequent Montreal Protocol created "more substantive obligations"). See,
e.g., Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of
Sulfur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Percent in United Nations: Protocols to the
1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, July 8, 1985, 27 I.L.M. 698, 707; Protocol
to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Emissions of Nitrogen
Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes, Oct. 31, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 212, 216; Protocol to the 1979 Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic
Compounds or their Transboundary Fluxes, Nov. 18, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 573; Montreal Protocol on Substances
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international legal efforts failed to accomplish much.39
The Framework Convention that emerged from the Earth Summit established an objective for the
international community, namely "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."40 The Framework Convention
contains a set of obligations and principles designed to help the world work toward meeting this objective.41 The
discussion that follows focuses on the obligations and principles most relevant to the emissions trading idea and
the "cheap fix" versus "free lunch" theme.42

a. The Developed Country Leadership Principle
The 154 states that signed the Framework Convention agreed upon a principle of "common but
differentiated responsibilities," which appears in article 3, section 1.43 This principle requires all countries to
assume some responsibility for addressing climate change while allowing the vigor of each nation's response to
vary. This principle addresses the problem of reconciling equity with the need for global efforts addressing a

that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989)
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537 [hereinafter London
Amendments].
39.See David S. Ardia, Does the Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement of International Laws Protecting
the Marine Environment, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 497, 526 (1998) ("Few international agreements contain
substantive commitments ._._._."); cf. Catherine Tinker, Responsibility for Biological Diversity
Conservation Under International Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 777, 813 (1995) ("it is too early to tell
how effectively the treaty will be implemented ._._._."); Amanda Hubbard, Comment, The Convention on
Biological Diversity's Fifth Anniversary: A General Overview of the ConventionEMDWhere has it Been and
Where is it Going?, 10 TUL. ENVT'L L.J. 415, 444 (1997) (substantively, the convention has accomplished
little). See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818; Lee A. Kimball, The
Biodiversity Convention: How to Make It Work, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 763, 765 (1995).
40.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 854.
41.See Lang, supra note 15, at 172 (pointing out in 1991 that potential state parties already understand that
a global warming regime would probably consist of a framework convention supplemented by more specific
protocols).
42.For a comprehensive treatment of the Framework Convention see Bodansky, supra note 2. See also Dr.
Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, supra note 2.
43.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(1), 31 I.L.M. at 854.
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problem to which all countries contribute.44
The principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" also reflects the experience of the rather
successful effort to address similar equitable problems while preventing stratospheric ozone depletion.45 Several
chemicals tend to deplete the stratospheric ozone layer, which shields human beings from harmful levels of
ultraviolet radiation. At the time the international community agreed to phase out several chemicals under the
Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Chemicals, the industrialized world used large amounts of these substances
as refrigerants and industrial solvents.46 Developing countries were not prepared to give up the future benefit of
refrigeration or domestic industries that use solvents, benefits long enjoyed by developed countries.47 So the
developed countries agreed to lead the effort to solve the environmental problem they caused by phasing out several
ozone-depleting substances during the Montreal Protocol's first decade.48 They also agreed to a program of
developing and transferring new technology to make it possible for less developed countries to enjoy refrigeration
and increased manufacturing capability without relying on ozone-depleting chemicals.49 The Montreal Protocol
authorized some initial increases in developing countries' use of ozone depleters, but required developing countries

44.Article 3 section 1 of the Framework Convention clearly links equity to the common but differentiated
responsibilities principle. "The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities." Id. art. 3(1), 31 I.L.M. at 854; see also IPCC DIMENSIONS,
supra note 15, at 90.
45.IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 89 ("the Montreal Protocol approach was extensively discussed as a
`model' for the Framework Convention on Climate Change"); see Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Building a
Monitoring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 519, 519END31
(1991) (discussing the evolution of the legal regime protecting the ozone layer); RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK,
OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET (1991) (describing the diplomatic
history of the regime).
46.OECD, CLIMATE CHANGE: MOBILIZING GLOBAL EFFORT 95 (1997); see Montreal Protocol, supra note
37, art. 2, par. 1-4, 26 I.L.M. at 1552.
47.See generally Barratt-Brown, supra note 44, at 534 (discussing developing country dissatisfaction with
the agreement before concerns about availability of substitute chemicals were allayed).
48.See Montreal Protocol, supra note 37, art. 2, par. 1-4, 26 I.L.M. at 1552; London Amendments, supra
note 37, arts. 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E, 30 I.L.M. at 539END41, 543END45.
49.See Montreal Protocol, supra note 37, art. 5, par. 2-3, 26 I.L.M. at 1556. The parties subsequently
agreed to create a multilateral fund to promote this technology transfer. See London Amendments, supra
note 37, arts. 10, 10A, 30 I.L.M. at 550END51.
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to reduce consumption of these chemicals a decade after the developed countries phased them out.50 Developing
countries agreed to a late phaseout because they believed that developed countries would develop adequate
substitutes as they eliminated their own consumption of ozone depleters.51 Accordingly, developing countries could
help solve the environmental problem without foregoing benefits formerly associated with use of ozone depleters.
The developed countries did, in fact, develop adequate substitutes for many ozone-depleting chemicals, many of
which actually cost less than the chemicals they replaced.52
The Framework Convention's principle of "common but differentiated responsibility" to address climate
change includes a principle of developed country leadership. Article 3, section 1 states that the differentiated
responsibilities must match the "respective capabilities" of the various countries.53 It then states, "[a]ccordingly, the
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change . . . ."54
The delegates to the Earth Summit envisioned leadership similar to that developed countries showed in
addressing ozone depletion.55 The structure of the specific obligations developed countries assumed under the
Framework Convention helps flesh out the contours of this leadership principle.
The leadership principle includes an expectation that developed countries will make earlier and/or deeper
cuts in greenhouse gas emissions than less developed countries, as under the Montreal Protocol.56 The Framework
Convention obligates developed countries to adopt measures and policies with an "aim of returning" greenhouse

50.See Montreal Protocol, supra note 37, art. 5, par. 1, 26 I.L.M. at 1555; London Amendments, supra note
37, art. 5, 30 I.L.M. at 547END48.
51.OECD, supra note 45, at 93 (target dates for phaseout are later than similar obligations for developed
countries to allow "time for effective technology transfer and cooperation").
52.Id. at 97 (replacements for ozone depleting substances "have frequently proved cheaper and more
effective than" the substances they replaced).
53.IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 89.
54.Id.
55.OECD, supra note 45, at 97 (stating that the approach to ozone depleting chemicals relied upon a
principle of "common but differentiated" responsibilities).
56.See NICK MABEY ET AL., ARGUMENT IN THE GREENHOUSE: THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS OF
CONTROLLING GLOBAL WARMING 11 (1997) (the "general tone of the agreement is that the developed
countries must demonstrate that they are serious about limiting emissions ._._.").
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gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.57
This stabilization target does not apply to developing countries. Rather, the Framework Convention
obligates developing countries to "address," rather than stabilize, greenhouse gas emissions.58 Hence, the
leadership principle calls on developed countries to exercise leadership by example, i.e., by stabilizing emissions
before requiring developing countries to do so.
The Framework Convention explicitly links differentiation of emissions control obligations to the
leadership principle. It requires that developed countries' "policies and measures . . . demonstrate that developed
countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions." 59 The reference to
"longer-term trends" may obligate developed countries to meet the near term stabilization goal through methods
that might make subsequent reductions easier. Modifying long-term trends requires reductions not just in the next
few years, but also far into the future. Innovation can lower long-term costs and make subsequent achievements
easier.60
The obligations respecting rainforests also reflect some differentiation of responsibilities. The Framework
Convention obligates developed countries to protect and enhance carbon sinks. 61 Developing countries, on the
other hand, need only "address" removal by sinks and "promote and cooperate in the conservation and
enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks . . . ."62 The Framework Convention differentiates responsibilities by using
more qualified language to describe the developing country obligation than the language describing the developed
57.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(2)(a), (b), 31 I.L.M. at 856END57. This stabilization target
for emissions reflects a compromise between the United States, which did not want to reduce emissions, and
most other developed countries, which seemed willing to make some cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. See
Bodansky, supra note 2, at 468, 475, 490END91; PRUE TAYLOR, AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 332 (1998) (the United States achieved a "watering down of obligations by continual
threats to boycott" the Earth Summit); James A. Beard, An Application of the Principles of Sustainability to
the Problem of Global Climate Change: An Argument for Integrated Energy Services, 11 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 191, 203 (1996) (discussing successful U.S. efforts to defeat a proposal to reduce emissions by 20%).
58.Framework Convention, supra note 9, 31 I.L.M. at 855.
59.Id. art. 4(2)(a), 31 I.L.M. at 856.
60.See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69
CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1260, 1279, 1285, 1311 (1981); 1995 IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 37
(innovation provides perhaps the best opportunity for low cost reductions).
61.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(2)(a), 31 I.L.M. at 856.
62.Id. art. 4(1)(b), (d), 31 I.L.M. at 855 (emphasis added).
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country obligation.63
The Framework Convention does not, however, impose a clear specific quantitative commitment or goal
upon any country's rainforest protection or enhancement efforts. The Framework Convention does not explicitly
state, for example, that all countries must halt rainforest destruction or limit its loss by a fixed percentage or
acreage amount.64
The leadership principle also requires the most developed countries to provide technological and financial
support to aid developing countries' efforts to address climate change.65 Specifically, the most developed countries
must provide the "agreed full incremental cost" of developing country treaty compliance, including funds "for the
transfer of technology."66 This language closely resembles language in the London Amendments to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer67 that promised technological and economic assistance
deemed essential to realizing protocol objectives equitably and effectively.68
Since developing countries did commit to addressing greenhouse gas emissions and sink conservation and
enhancement, the developed countries' commitment to financing these efforts has meaning even prior to adoption

63.If the "as appropriate" language requires enhancement of sinks only when appropriate, with conservation
being an option when it is more appropriate, then the language actually constitutes a nearly equivalent
obligation. If on the other hand, the "as appropriate" language means that the country may forego
conservation and enhancement when neither seems appropriate to it, then the language imposes a much
lesser obligation.
64.The lack of an explicit demand for developed country leadership in sink conservation based upon a
quantitative commitment probably reflects two problems. First, reform of national policies to actually
reverse rainforest destruction poses enormous political and economic challenges. Second, most of the
rainforest lies in developing rather than developed countries. This means that an approach based on strict
conservation in developed countries would have little direct impact on most of the world's rainforests. See
IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 95 (almost all carbon dioxide emissions from deforestation come from
"a relatively small group of developing countries"). By contrast, developed country reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions would have great impact on worldwide emissions, since developed countries account for most
of the world's emissions.
65.The term "most developed countries" refers to the countries listed in Annex II to the Framework
Convention, which generally excludes the former Soviet Union and much of eastern Europe. See
Framework Convention, supra note 9, Annex II, 31 I.L.M. at 873.
66.Id. art. 4(3), 31 I.L.M. at 858.
67.See London Amendments, supra note 37, art. 10, par. 1, 30 I.L.M. at 550.
68.See id. art. 10, at 550 (requiring funding of "all agreed incremental costs" of developing country
compliance); id. art. 10A, at 551 (requiring each party to take "every practicable step" to ensure appropriate
technology transfer).
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of quantitative commitments. Indeed, developing countries without quantitative commitments have implemented
several energy conservation and renewable energy projects.69 The Framework Convention creates a financing
mechanism to support such efforts.70
The Preamble to the Framework Convention also reflects the technological and financial components of
the leadership principle. It recognizes that developing countries will actually need to increase energy consumption
in order to grow, but qualifies this recognition by "taking into account the possibilities for achieving greater energy
efficiency . . . ."71 The Preamble then recognizes that energy efficiency involves "application of new technologies
on terms which make such application economically and socially beneficial."72
The Framework Convention clearly envisions leadership from developed countries. More precisely, the
Framework Convention reflects an expectation that developed countries will apply advanced technologies to
improve energy efficiency and reduce emissions and then transfer the fruits of these efforts to less developed
countries with appropriate financial support. This differentiation of responsibility should lead developing countries,
in time, to accept more concrete commitments under the treaty.

b. The Cost-Effectiveness Principle
The Framework Convention also contains a cost-effectiveness principle. This principle arises in the
context of an articulation of the "precautionary principle," a general principle of international environmental law.
The precautionary principle counsels nations to address environmental problems as a precaution even in the face of
scientific uncertainty.73 Article 3, section 3, states that "lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a

69.See also Wirth, supra note 12, at 2656 (discussing potential for energy efficiency improvements in
developing countries); IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 88 (explaining that "solar, wind, and hydro power
can be either carbon-free or carbon neutral").
70.See Framework Convention, supra note 9, arts. 4(3), 11, 31 I.L.M. at 858, 864END65. For negotiating
history and parsing of details see Bodansky, supra note 2, at 524END27.
71.Framework Convention, supra note 9, preamble, 31 I.L.M. at 853.
72.Id.; see also Wirth, supra note 12, at 2657 (energy efficiency and conservation could help developing
countries avoid at least $1.4 trillion in power supply expansion costs between 1990 and 2008).
73.See Weiss, supra note 25, at 690 (stating that there is no agreement on the content or existence of the
principle); Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle, 33 ENV'T 4 (1991);
M.P.A. Kindall, UNCED and the Evolution of Principles of International Environmental Law, 25 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 19, 23 (1991) (discussing elements of a precautionary approach).
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means of postponing" measures needed to respond to "threats of serious or irreversible damage."
This precautionary principle has special salience in the climate change context, because of the particulars
of the science. Greenhouse gases emitted today commit the world to climate change decades (if not centuries)
hence, because they remain in the atmosphere for many decades after their emission.74 In addition, scientists fear
that climate change may occur quickly and unpredictably.75 Hence, waiting for scientific certainty before taking
action may involve suffering through decades or centuries of hurricanes, droughts, ecological destruction, and sea
level rise. This is so even if a moment of actual certainty arrives exactly as these disasters begin, and this
recognition triggers an immediate and vigorous response.76 Climate-induced environmental change cannot be
reversed quickly, and may not be reversible at all, due to the long time scales involved.77 The paragraph that
articulates the precautionary principle states that countries' response measures "should be cost-effective so as to
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost."78
The cost effectiveness principle found in article 3, section 3 of the Framework Convention may conflict
with the developed country leadership principle. The leadership principle calls on developed countries to make the
earliest and/or deepest emission cuts in order to develop the technologies needed for everyone to make progress.
Cuts in greenhouse gas emissions may be more expensive in developed countries than in developing countries,
because developing countries use such primitive technology that improving technology to reduce emissions often

74.IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 3 (explaining that long lives of greenhouse gases means that "they
affect radiative forcing on long time scales"); IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 4 (stating that given a stable
level of greenhouse gas emissions, stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of long-lived greenhouse
gases will require decades to millennia, and that stabilization of atmospheric concentrations will only
produce "equilibration of the climate system" in decades to centuries).
75.William K. Stevens, If Climate Changes, It May Change Quickly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1998, at F1;
IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 25; WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING 34END35
(1992) (reviewing several potential catastrophe scenarios).
76.Furthermore, "[u]nambiguous detection of climate-induced changes in most ecological and social
systems will prove extremely difficult in the coming decades." IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 5; cf. NASA
Scientists Propose Climate Index; Suggest Change Apparent in Alaska, Asia, 21 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 446
(Apr. 29, 1998) (discussing index designed to distinguish long-term climate change from natural
fluctuations).
77.IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 23.
78.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(3), 31 I.L.M. at 854.
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costs very little.79 But the principle of developed country leadership would seem to require that the potentially more
expensive cuts from developed countries come first.
Article 3, section 3 addresses this potential conflict and suggests that the leadership principle may qualify
the cost effectiveness principle. It states that policies and measures should "take into account different socioeconomic contexts."80 This statement suggests that more economically advanced countries should carry most of the
burden.
Since article 3, section 3 calls for taking both cost effectiveness and differing socio-economic contexts into
account, it fails to definitively resolve the tension between the cost effectiveness and leadership principles. In light
of the wealth of support for the leadership principle in the convention's preamble,81 principles,82 commitments,83
and precedent,84 the cost effectiveness principle ought not defeat the leadership principle. On the other hand, cost
effectiveness clearly has a role to play under the treaty. So far, cost effectiveness concerns have tended to dominate
debates about implementation of the Climate Change Convention.85
The commitments in the Framework Convention did not effectively address the climate change problem.86
Since the Framework Convention's signing, greenhouse gas emissions and rainforest destruction have increased in
many countries. The failure to agree on clearly binding numerical limits to greenhouse gas emissions or rainforest
destruction helps explain this failure. Although developed countries did agree upon an emissions stabilization

79.See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 521 ("developing countries tend to use energy less efficiently than
developed countries and can attain emissions reductions more cheaply.").
80.Id.
81.See Framework Convention, supra note 9, preamble, 31 I.L.M. at 851END53.
82.See id. art. 3(1), (2), 31 I.L.M. at 854.
83.See id. art. 4, 31 I.L.M. at 855END59.
84.See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 37, art. 2, 26 I.L.M. at 1552END54; London Amendments, supra
note 37, 30 I.L.M. at 539END45.
85.See Alex G. Hanafi, Note, Joint Implementation: Legal and Institutional Issues for an Effective
International Program to Combat Climate Change, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 461END62 (1998).
86.See MATTHEW PATERSON, GLOBAL WARMING AND GLOBAL POLITICS 64 (1996) (commentators generally
agree that the Framework Convention is environmentally inadequate).
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target, the treaty language does not clearly state whether this target is a mere goal or a binding commitment. 87
The Framework Convention, however, articulates principles that establish a foundation for subsequent
agreements to move further.88 In effect, the Earth Summit created international legal norms to guide subsequent
efforts to write more specific rules to address climate change, even if it did not itself produce a set of rules that
would actually improve the environment.89

B. The Kyoto Protocol to The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The Framework Convention generally requires its "supreme body", the Conference of the Parties (COP), 90
to meet periodically to review the adequacy of the convention and national implementation efforts.91 By the mid1990s, it was obvious that developed countries, including the United States, would not meet the Framework
Convention's target, stabilization of emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.92 Moreover, the overwhelming
majority of scientists agreed that the parties needed to make cuts substantially below 1990 levels, not just stabilize
emissions at those levels, to even stabilize atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide at very high levels many
years in the future.93 Furthermore, stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at these already high levels commits
the earth to rising global temperatures and sea level rise for hundreds of years after stabilization.94
87.See Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(2), 31 I.L.M. at 856END57.
88.See JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 217 (explaining that the Framework Convention may generate
expectations that lead to firm legal rules in the future).
89.See McAdams, supra note 7, at 383END84 (explaining that communities internalize abstract norms prior
to more concrete norms translating the abstraction into concrete behavior).
90.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(2), 31 I.L.M. at 860END61.
91.Id. art. 7, 31 I.L.M. at 860END62. In particular, it requires a review of the adequacy of the principle
commitments in the treaty at its first session and again, no later than the end of 1998. See id. arts. 4(d),
7(4), 31 I.L.M. at 857, 862.
92.See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Second Session, Framework Convention on Climate
Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15, at 5 (1996) [hereinafter COP2 Report] (first national
communications of developed country parties revealed that they "expected to be unable to meet the emission
reduction targets of the Convention" to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels).
93.IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 25; IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 1994: RADIATIVE FORCING OF
CLIMATE CHANGE AND AN EVALUATION OF THE IPCC 1S92 EMISSION SCENARIOS (J.T. Houghton et al. eds.,
1995) [hereinafter IPCC, RADIATIVE FORCING].
94.IPCC 1995 SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 45.
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The COP agreed to meet in Kyoto in 1997 to enact protocols aimed at making the Convention more
effective.95 Prior to this meeting, the European Union proposed a fifteen percent reduction in each developed
country's greenhouse gas emissions.96 In the United States, this proposal alarmed industries that relied heavily on
fossil fuel burning. These industries sought to persuade the President and the Congress to take positions that would
assure a failure to adopt concrete commitments to emission reductions at Kyoto.
The United States Senate passed a resolution demanding that the United States accept no agreement
quantitatively limiting greenhouse gases unless developing countries also agreed to reduce in the same time
period.97 Compliance with this resolution would rule out emulation of the specific approach used to reduce
stratospheric ozone depletionEMDthat is, deferring developing country emission reductions until after developed
countries have already completed substantial cuts. Indeed, one could imagine only one possible international
agreement that might represent real compliance with the emission reduction component of the leadership principle,
while remaining consistent with the Congressional resolution. In theory, the developed world could agree to deep
cuts and secure commitments from less developed countries for modest reductions over the same time period.
The Clinton Administration, however, took a position that appeared to preclude this outcome. Just prior to
the Kyoto meeting, President Clinton announced that the United States would seek a postponement of the 2000
deadline for stabilization at 1990 levels, rather than accept cuts in emissions below 1990 levels.98 Given this
position, adherence to the developed country leadership principle would almost surely conflict with the combined
positions of the executive and legislative branches of the American government. Developing countries could not

95.See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session, The Berlin Mandate: Review of the
Adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), of the Convention, including proposals related to the
protocol and decisions on follow-up, Decision 1/CP.1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1995), 34 I.L.M.
1671, 1676 (concluding that the commitments made in the Framework Convention are inadequate and
calling for establishment of "quantified limitation and reduction objectives").
96.Paola Bettelli et al. eds., Report of the Third Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change: 1END11 December 1997, 12 EARTH NEG. BULL. 76, at 2 (available at
<http://www.iisd.ca>) (visited May 15, 1998) [hereinafter COP3 Summary]. More precisely, the European
Union proposed a fifteen percent reduction from 1990 levels of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide
by 2010. Patricia Thompson, The Third Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change: The December 1997 Kyoto Protocol, Y.B. COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 219, 221 (1997).
97.143 CONG. REC. S8113END05 (daily ed. July 25, 1997).
98.See Searles, supra note 5, at 134 (describing U.S. agreement to a seven percent cut as a "significant
change from its earlier proposal to merely stabilize emissions at the 1990 level").
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make any cuts below 1990 levels without making more reductions than the developed countries would under the
United States proposal, since the United States proposal called for no cuts from developed countries.99
After Vice President Gore instructed the U.S. negotiators to show more "flexibility," they helped break the
impasse this initial position created by agreeing to slightly more vigorous action. 100 The resulting Kyoto Protocol to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol) does not contain rules limiting
emissions of particular gases.101 Instead, the parties agreed to a more abstract limit, a limit on aggregate
greenhouse gas emissions.102 This approach allows countries to forego carbon dioxide reductions in exchange for
reducing other specifically listed greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol requires each developed country to meet
quantitative limits for "carbon dioxide equivalent emissions."103 The protocol uses an estimate of the "global
warming potential" of listed greenhouse gases to measure the worth of reducing other gases in lieu of carbon
dioxide.104
The Kyoto Protocol contemplates at least a five percent reduction in developed country greenhouse gas
emissions, on average, by the "commitment period 2008 to 2012."105 The Kyoto Protocol supplements this aim
with more specific binding national quantitative reduction requirements. In a break with precedent, the Protocol

99.See generally AUSTIN, supra note 27, at 17 (if the United States opts to delay emission reductions
developing countries will almost certainly follow suit).
100.See Joby Warrick, Gore Urges Resolution at Climate Talks; With Summit in Disarray, Vice President
Prods U.S. Negotiators to Bridge Gaps, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1998, at A1; Searles, supra note 5, at 134
(describing U.S. compromise in agreeing to a seven percent reduction below 1990 levels).
101.Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10. See generally Searles, supra note 5; Clare Breidenich et al., The Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 315 (1998).
102.Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, arts. 3(1), 5(3), 37 I.L.M. at 33, 35.
103.Id. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33.
104.Id. art. 5(3), 37 I.L.M. at 35. The listed gases are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. See id. Annex A, 37 I.L.M. at 42. Estimates
of the relative global warming potential of greenhouses gases have substantial uncertainties. See IPCC 1995
SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 188; IPCC, RADIATIVE FORCING, supra note 92. The parties must use the
estimates of relative global warming potential over a 100 year period provided in the relevant 1995 IPCC
report as the basis for tradeoffs amongst gases. Methodological Issues Related to the Kyoto Protocol, in
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Third Session, FCCC/COP, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, at 31.
105.Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33.
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actually assigns different percentage reduction requirements to different developed nations.106 For example, Japan,
the United States, and the European Union may have to reduce emissions by six, seven, and eight percent,
respectively, but the Kyoto Protocol authorizes some developed countries with more modest emissions to actually
increase their pollution within specified limits.107
This modest five percent average cut from developed countries left little room for differentiated
developing country reductions, and the Kyoto Protocol contains no specific mandates for developing country
emission reductions.108 Hence, the agreement may not meet the strictures of the Senate resolution, and United
States ratification of the agreement, which requires Senate approval, remains uncertain.109 The Protocol will only
enter into force if nations responsible for fifty-five percent of the developed country emissions ratify the Protocol.
Hence, a failure by the United States and Russia to ratify the Protocol could prevent its entry into force.110 Because
the Protocol only modestly limits developed country emissions and does not limit developing country emissions,
global carbon emissions may still rise by thirty-two percent by the year 2010, even assuming full compliance.111

C. Accountability under the Climate Change Convention

106.See id. Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 42.
107.See id.
108.These cuts are modest in the sense that they call for much less reduction than a number of climate
change scientists called for. See Proposal Forwarded by 100 Countries Calls for Trading System, `Green
Bank,' 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1527, 1528 (Dec. 5, 1997) (quoting David Rind, a climate modeler with the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, as stating that "none
of the targets floated ._._. go far enough."); David Malakoff, Thirty Kyotos Needed to Control Warming,
278 SCIENCE 2048 (1997) (reporting climate scientists' skepticism about the adequacy of Kyoto's cuts).
Furthermore, a five percent reduction may be extremely inexpensive. See CLINE, supra note 74 (suggesting
that a 20% cut in emissions may be available at no cost); Ross Gelbspan, A Good Climate For Investment,
281 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1, 1998 at 26 (stating that 30% reductions have "no negative economic
impacts").
109.See Searles, supra note 5, at 134; John J. Fialka, GlobalEMDWarming Debate Gets No Consensus in
Industry, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1998, at A24 (describing Congressional opposition to treaty
implementation).
110.See Key Issues Outlined for Upcoming Talks on International Emission Trading System, 21 Int'l Env't
Rep. 414, 415 (BNA) (Apr. 29, 1998).
111.See Carbon Emissions Predicted to Increase Substantially by 2020, DOE Report Says, 21 Int'l Env't
Rep. 439 (BNA) (Apr. 29, 1998).
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The Climate Change Convention establishes international law.112 Traditionally, scholars have viewed
international law as the set of legal norms governing relationships between states.113 But non-state actors, such as
environmental groups, have a growing role in generating and ensuring compliance with international law.114
Government officials seek to reach international environmental agreements because public demands and public
scrutiny of implementation help the legal regime function.115
International environmental law regimes govern more than just relationships between states. International
environmental law seeks to induce state action to protect the environment.116 In most contexts, this means that
international environmental law seeks state actions aimed at changing private conduct. No international military
force exists to force nations to meet quantitative national limits in an international treaty. 117 Hence, a treaty must
rely upon other methods to induce compliance.118
Countries generally honor specific international legal obligations.119 This article cannot offer a complete

112.JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 219.
113.See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §_101 (1986).
114.See generally JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 176END77; Barratt-Brown, supra note 44, at 520END22.
115.See JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 248 (stating that pressure may be needed to make international law
"change or evolve" and that laws "heighten public expectations").
116.See id. at 151 ("Domestic implementation of international agreements is obviously important for the
successful implementation of a regime.").
117.See Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments
Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 299 ("no world governmentENDor any other
institutionENDappears capable of administering, monitoring and enforcing" international mechanisms to
meet climate change goals). See generally Kratochwil, supra note 7, at 256 (stating that international law is
not primarily a "punitive order").
118.JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 113 (referring to the need for a "substitute for coercion" in making
international legal regimes effective); Ardia, supra note 38, at 510 ("Because most ._._. environmental
agreements are only morally binding ._._. [their] success ._._. depends upon" voluntary national efforts to
"enforce compliance amongst their citizens.").
119.LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d. ed. 1979); cf. Harold K. Jacobson, Conceptual,
Methodological and Substantive Issues Entwined in Studying Compliance, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 569,
570END71 (1998) (we have a lack of systematic knowledge about the extent of compliance); Harold Jacobson
& Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords: Preliminary
Observations from a Collaborative Project, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119, 122 (1995) (compliance with
international environmental agreements is often "haphazard and ragged").
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theory as to why nations usually comply or why they sometimes do not comply with international law.120 But
democratic accountability may play a role.121
First, national leaders may desire esteem from their peers in other countries.122 To the extent their
countries violate clear international legal obligations, they may lose face in front of their peers in other
countries.123 Hence, they may feel accountable toward their peers and comply out of a sense of obligation toward
them.124
Second, national leaders may fear direct loss of prestige for themselves and their countries as a result of
noncompliance.125 If the world's people regard a nation as a violator of international law, this reduces the regard
people around the world have for the country.126 National leaders may feel some accountability toward world public
opinion.127
Finally, leaders who violate international treaty commitments may offend voters in their own countries
who identify with a treaty's goals.128 As a result, failure to abide by treaties may harm officials in national
elections.129 Loss of international prestige may harm leaders of non-compliant countries at home as well, by

120.Professor Koh has sought to explain this in terms of transnational legal process. See generally Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (review essay)
[hereinafter Koh, Why Nations Obey?]; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV.
181 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, Transnational].
121.See Lang, supra note 15, at 167 (explaining how green lobbies and public opinion helped create
agreement to strong measures protecting the stratospheric ozone layer); Jacobsen & Weiss, supra note 118
(discussing various factors that influence compliance, including NGO participation, information, and
political characteristics of implementing countries).
122.See JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 113 (states are accountable to other states).
123.See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 533 (meetings of the COP provide a forum for discussions among states
and bring peer pressure to comply).
124.See generally Sunstein, supra note 7, at 2029END30 (an expectation of shame may deter people from
violating norms).
125.See Koh, Why Nations Obey?, supra note 119, at 2639 (discussing claim that fear of "loss of
reputation" provides the "ultimate impetus for compliance").
126.See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 533 (meetings of COP help focus "public pressure" on states to comply).
127.See JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 113 (states are accountable to the international public).
128.See id. (states are accountable to their own populations).
129.See PATERSON, supra note 84, at 61END62 (describing how the United States modified its position on
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damaging their credibility.
For these potential consequences to motivate national leaders to comply, the leaders must perceive these
consequences as a plausible result of violations. To achieve this, a mechanism must exist for detecting and
publicizing treaty violations.130 In the climate change context, this mechanism includes reporting and publication
of national plans to meet targets and the data necessary to determine whether the nation is delivering the required
reductions.131 The Climate Change Convention contains provisions that address this.132
The Climate Change Convention has provisions aimed at generating national plans to meet the targets. It
requires all parties to "publish . . . programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change"133 The
Convention also requires developed countries to send the COP "a detailed description of . . . measures that it has
adopted" and "a specific estimate" of its policies' effects.134 The Convention requires an expert "subsidiary body for
implementation" to review these descriptions and report the results to the COP.135 It cautiously requires the COP to
seek and use, "where appropriate," information from "non-governmental bodies."136 The Convention thus provides
a potential role for environmental groups in assessing ongoing implementation efforts.
The Framework Convention also provides for the COP's assessment and publication of implementation

climate change after George Bush endured criticism from Democratic Presidential candidates for his initial
position).
130.See generally Jacob Werksman, Compliance Systems and the Climate Change Convention: Traffic
Signs on the Road to Kyoto 2 (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (citing the wide
agreement on the need for "a robust and transparent" system of detecting non-compliance); Ardia, supra
note 38, at 505 (describing international cooperation in monitoring and enforcement as crucial to making
environmental agreements meaningful).
131.See Werksman, supra note 129. (describing the evaluation of compliance in the Climate Change
regime).
132.See Framework Convention, supra note 9, arts. 4, 7, 9, 10, 12, 31 I.L.M. at 855; Kyoto Protocol, supra
note 10, arts. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 37 I.L.M. at 37.
133.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(1)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 855; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art.
10(a), (b), 37 I.L.M. at 37.
134.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 12(2), 31 I.L.M. 865; see id. art. 4(2)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 857.
135.Id. art. 10, 31 I.L.M. at 863END64.
136.Id. art. 7, 31 I.L.M. at 861.
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information.137 The Framework Convention requires the COP to "assess . . . implementation of the
[C]onvention,"138 "adopt" and publish "regular reports" on the "implementation of the Convention,"139 and
"facilitate" information exchange amongst parties "on measures adopted" to meet treaty commitments.140 On the
other hand, the Framework Convention authorizes a party to designate information about compliance as
confidential, thereby preventing its submission to other bodies, except as part of aggregated data.141 This provision
could frustrate efforts to hold individual countries responsible for noncompliance, thereby reducing the
effectiveness of public accountability in encouraging compliance.
Reporting about national plans may provide information that can be used to assess whether countries have
plans that appear likely to succeed. This alone may create pressures to adopt credible plans. However, information
about plans cannot tell the international community whether plans succeed in meeting their targets.
Accordingly, the Framework Convention contains provisions designed to develop the information needed
to assess actual physical compliance with emission reduction targets.142 Since the Kyoto Protocol expresses
national emission limitations as a percentage of greenhouse gas emissions in 1990,143 one would need to know at
least the 1990 emissions, and the emissions during the compliance period (2008 to 2012), to determine whether
compliance has occurred.144 Monitoring of progress toward the quantitative targets requires reporting interim
emissions.

137.See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 547 (explaining why treaty language probably does contemplate review
of individual country performance).
138.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(2)(e), 31 I.L.M. at 861.
139.Id. art. 7(2)(f), 31 I.L.M. at 861.
140.Id. art. 7(2)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 861.
141.Id. art. 12(9), 31 I.L.M. at 866.
142.Professor Robert N. Stavins argues that it may not be necessary to monitor ex post compliance if an ex
ante "demonstration of likely compliance" has been made. See Stavins, supra note 116, at 310. This
argument overlooks a long history of failure to produce planned reductions of pollutants, even in developed
countries such as the United States. It seems extraordinarily naïve. At any rate, Professor Stavins' judgment
on this matter conflicts with that of the international community framing the treaty, which has provided, at
least loosely, for generation of information that could help verify post-hoc compliance.
143.See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 42.
144.See id. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33.
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The Framework Convention requires all parties to "develop, periodically update, publish and make
available to the Conference of the Parties . . . national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions."145 If these
inventories include accurate estimates of 1990 baseline emissions of each relevant gas and provide timely and
accurate information on current emissions, then it should be possible to determine whether a country has complied
with the percentage limitations set out in the agreement.
The Kyoto Protocol contains provisions designed to adapt these requirements to the task of actually
monitoring compliance with quantitative limits. Article 5 requires developed countries to estimate anthropogenic
emissions and sink removals using methodologies that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the
COP agree upon.146 Article 7 requires these countries to submit annual inventories of emissions and sinks
including "supplementary information" to make sure that compliance with the new limits can be verified. 147 The
Kyoto Protocol further requires expert review teams to "provide a thorough and comprehensive technical
assessment of . . . implementation" and to communicate this assessment to the COP. 148 The Kyoto Protocol then
requires the COP to assess implementation.149
The Climate Change Convention vaguely authorizes the COP to "make recommendations on any matters
necessary for" implementation.150 It also creates a dispute settlement procedure.151 This procedure relies primarily
upon negotiation and non-binding arbitration, rather than binding dispute resolution.152 Article 14 of the

145.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(1)(a), 31 I.L.M. at 855; see id. art. 12(1), 31 I.L.M. at 865.
146.See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 5, 37 I.L.M. at 35.
147.Id. art. 7, 37 I.L.M. at 35END36.
148.Id. art. 8, 37 I.L.M. at 36.
149.See id. art. 13(4)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 39.
150.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(2)(g), 31 I.L.M. at 861; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art.
13(4)(f), 37 I.L.M. at 39.
151.See Framework Convention, supra note 9, arts. 13, 14, 31 I.L.M. at 866END67; see also Bodansky,
supra note 2, at 547END49.
152.The treaty establishes a "multilateral consultative process" to resolve "questions regarding" convention
implementation. Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 13, 31 I.L.M. at 866. Article 14, section 1
requires parties to a dispute to "seek ._._. settlement ._._. through negotiation." If this negotiation process
fails, a party may secure convocation of a "conciliation commission." Id. art. 14(5), (6), 31 I.L.M. at 867.
The commission only makes a "recommendatory award," which "the parties" must "consider in good faith."
Id. art 14(6), 31 I.L.M. at 867.
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Framework Convention also allows parties to mutually agree that disputes will be submitted to the International
Court of Justice and/or binding arbitration.153 These procedures only apply to disputes between national
governments. The formal dispute resolution provisions do not provide a mechanism for non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), including environmental advocacy groups, to seek redress of complaints.
Since the COP meets regularly, its ongoing review processes provide a forum that may expose defects in
national implementation.154 This tends to facilitate peer and public pressure to comply, making countries more
accountable for implementation failures.155 A provision in the Framework Convention which allows NGOs to
participate in COP meetings unless at least a third of the parties present object may help facilitate public
accountability.156 Unlike some international agreements, the Framework Convention does not contemplate the use
of trade sanctions to secure compliance157EMDnor does it mandate binding dispute resolution.
In sum, the Kyoto Protocol (absent trading) creates a concrete obligation to meet national aggregate
emission limitations. The Climate Change Convention seeks to require the submission of national plans that make
before the fact assessment of progress toward implementation possible. The Convention also requires the
availability of adequate national information to enable the world to ascertain (after the fact) whether a country has
complied with specific limits on national emissions. Each country may make sufficient plans to avoid the
embarrassment of facing accusations in a public forum that it failed to meet an international obligation.158 Through

153.Id. art. 14(2-4), 31 I.L.M. at 867.
154.See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 533. The COP meets annually unless it decides otherwise. See
Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(4), (5), 31 I.L.M. at 855END61.
155.See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 533.
156.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(6), 31 I.L.M. at 862.
157.See generally Foundation for International Environmental Law, Implementing the Climate Change
Convention: Trade Law Implications on the Road to Kyoto and Beyond (1997) (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
158.I use the term "may" deliberately. In spite of the existence of the formal structure described, the relevant
international institutions and the NGOs may lack the capacity to comprehensively monitor implementation
efforts. See Ardia, supra note 38, at 512, 524END25 (discussing the inadequacy of funding of the United
Nations Environmental Program and the weakness of Secretariats of environmental treaties); Kamen
Sachariew, Promoting Compliance with International Legal Standards: Reflections on Monitoring and
Reporting Mechanisms, 2 Y.B. OF INT'L ENVTL. L. 37, 39 (1991) (noting that the high cost of "maintaining
large scale permanent monitoring networks" limits NGO's involvement in monitoring). Monitoring remains
highly dependent upon cooperation from national governments.
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these mechanisms, the authors of the Climate Change Convention try to foster accountability for complying with
the Convention's mandates.

D. Emissions Trading
The United States has used emissions trading to address environmental problems over the years.159 From
the perspective of many American government officials, it seemed only natural to make international trading part
of the effort to address climate change. Not surprisingly, the United States has consistently worked to make
emissions trading a big part of the Climate Change Convention.160

1. Trading Under the Framework Convention
The Framework Convention does not explicitly mention emissions trading.161 But it refers to a concept
called "joint implementation," which one can plausibly interpret as a reference to trading.162 Article 4(2)(a), for
example, states that "[p]arties may implement . . . policies and measures jointly . . . ."163 This could be interpreted
159.See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 2, at 311END21.
160.The United States' insistence on this point almost torpedoed the negotiations at Kyoto. See COP3
Summary, supra note 95, at 11END12. The United States' made clear that its agreement to reductions
depended on acceptance of emissions trading. See Paola Bettelli et al., Highlights from the Third
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: 8 December
1997, 12 EARTH NEG. BULL. NO. 74 1, 2 (1997) [hereinafter Highlights]; see also COP2 Report, supra note
91, at 48 (United States' statement that "international emissions trading must be part of any future
regime."). The United States has not always been alone in its support of emissions trading. See Jonathan
Green and Philippe Sands, Establishing an International System for Trading Pollution Rights, 15 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 80, 82END83 (Feb. 12, 1992) (discussing an early emissions trading proposal put forth by
Norway and Germany).
161.See JOYEETA GUPTA, THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: FROM
CONFLICT TO CONSENSUS? 117 (1997) (Framework Convention "does not explicitly state" that a country
undertaking measures abroad "has the right to credit itself with part of the emission reductions.").
162.See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION TO CURB CLIMATE CHANGE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 1END6 (Onno
Kuik et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter JOINT IMPLEMENTATION]; S. Barrett, Joint Implementation for Achieving
National Abatement Commitments in the Framework Convention on Climate Change, OECD, Paris (1993);
JOINT IMPLEMENTATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE COMMITMENTS: OPPORTUNITIES AND APPREHENSIONS xi
(Prodipto Ghosh & Jyotsna Puri eds., 1994) [hereinafter OPPORTUNITIES AND APPREHENSIONS].
163.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(2)(a), 31 I.L.M. at 856. Furthermore, Article 4, section
2(b) establishes that developed countries must aim to return their emissions to 1990 levels "individually or
jointly." Id. art. 4(2)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 857. Article 4, section 2(d) provides that the Conference of the Parties
at its first session "shall ._._. take decisions regarding criteria for joint implementation ._._._." Id. art.
4(2)(d), 31 I.L.M. at 857.
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narrowly to mean that one country could help another achieve national emissions reductions.164 It could also be
interpreted broadly to allow a country to claim credits for activities it jointly implements abroad.165 These credits
could then justify not meeting otherwise applicable domestic obligations.
Recognizing that a mere reference to "joint implementation" raises more questions than it answers,166 the
parties agreed that the COP would "take (sic) decisions regarding criteria to govern joint implementation" at its
first session, within one year after the Framework Convention entered into force.167 Since then, the COP has failed
to agree upon detailed criteria governing joint implementation, but it has made a few general decisions.168
At its first meeting in Berlin, the COP clarified that developed countries could not claim credits for
activities implemented jointly with developing countries as a means of fulfilling the Framework Convention target
of stabilizing developed country emissions at 1990 levels.169 The COP, however, authorized the development of

164.See GUPTA, supra note 160, at 116 (stating that developing countries tend to interpret joint
implementation to refer to "general cooperation" in implementation rather than credit transfer).
165.See Navroz K. Dubash, Commoditizing Carbon: Social and Environmental Implications of Joint
Implementation, in OPPORTUNITIES AND APPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 51, 56 (setting out such a
definition).
166.See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 46, 78; GUPTA, supra note 160, at 116END17 (discussing
the ambiguous nature of the joint implementation text).
167.Framework Convention, supra note 9, arts. 4(2)(d), 7(4), 31 I.L.M. at 857, 862.
168.See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 73 (the FCCC does not define joint implementation);
Climate Change Convention Secretariat, Activities Implemented Jointly: Methodological Issues, The
Determination of Environmental Benefits Related to the Mitigation of Climate Change Through Activities
Implemented Jointly (visited Dec. 5, 1997) <http://www.unfccc.de/fccc/ccinfo/aij_radd.htr> (identifying
issues still unresolved in late 1997).
169.The COP recognized the following: (1) According to the provisions of the Convention, the
commitments under Article 4.2(a), to adopt national policies and to take corresponding measures on the
mitigation of climate change apply only to Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Parties),
and that Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (non-Annex I Parties) have no such
commitments; (2) Activities implemented jointly between Annex I Parties and non-Annex I Parties will not
be seen as fulfillment of current commitments of Annex I Parties under Article 4.2(b), of the Convention;
but they could contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Convention and to the fulfillment of
commitments of Annex II Parties under Article 4.5 of the Convention; (3) Activities implemented jointly
under the Convention are supplemental, and should only be treated as a subsidiary means of achieving the
objective of the Convention; (4) Activities implemented jointly in no way modify the commitments of each
Party under the Convention. Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot Phase in Report of the
Conference of the Parties on its First Session, Decision 5/CP.1, Apr. 7, 1995, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1995), 34 I.L.M. 1671, 1685 [hereinafter Pilot Phase Decision].
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pilot joint implementation projects, including projects carried out in developing countries.170 These pilot projects
involve voluntary commitments by governments and private companies to conduct cooperative international
activities that they characterize as contributing to the Convention's objectives.171 The COP established "a
framework for reporting . . . on the possible global benefits, . . . the national . . . impacts," and any "technical
difficulties encountered."172 The COP also decided on a set of very general criteria to govern joint implementation
during the pilot phase.173 It did not, however, agree upon a set of criteria to judge whether pilot projects fail or
succeed in demonstrating the feasibility of "joint implementation" as a credit generating activity. Nor did the COP
ever define precise criteria that these projects should meet or otherwise clarify the "joint implementation"
concept.174 Country reports on pilot projects generally do not describe environmental benefits in a detailed manner
and they rarely provide sufficient explanation of the basis for cost and greenhouse gas mitigation calculations. 175

170.See id. at 1686. For a recent report on the nature of the projects see Activities Implemented Jointly
Under the Pilot Phase: Synthesis Report on Activities Implemented Jointly (Note by the Secretariat),
FCCC/SBSTA, 7th Sess., Item 8 of the Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/1997/12 [hereinafter
Pilot Phase Report]; see also Glenn Wiser, Joint Implementation: Incentives for Private Sector Mitigation
of Global Climate Change, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 747, 751 (1997); GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, PUB. NO. DOE/PO-0048, ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED JOINTLY: FIRST REPORT TO THE SECRETARIAT
OF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (1996).
171.See Wiser, supra note 169, at 750; David Hodas, The Climate Change Convention and Evolving Legal
Models of Sustainable Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 93END94 (1995) (describing some
projects); Announcement of Ground Rules for U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,442
(1994).
172.Pilot Phase Decision, supra note 168 (ordering establishment of Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice to develop a reporting framework); Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot
Phase: Uniform Reporting Format, FCCC/SBSTA, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/1996/8, Annex IV
(1996) (subsidiary body's proposed reporting framework); Activities Implemented Jointly Under the Pilot
Phase, Decision 8/CP.2, FCCC/COP, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 (1996) at 14 (COP
invites parties to use the subsidiary body's reporting framework).
173.See Pilot Phase Decision, supra note 168. The COP decided that projects "should be ._._. supportive of
national environmental and development" policy and contribute to cost effectiveness. Id. at 1686. The
relevant governments should approve all projects. See id. "Activities implemented jointly should bring
about real, measurable and long-term environmental benefits related to the mitigation of climate change
that would not have occurred in the absence of such activities." Id. Finally, financing of joint
implementation "shall be additional to the financial obligations" already contained in the treaty. Id.
174.See Pilot Phase Decision, supra note 168. The COP decision does not explicitly define issues to
evaluate the utility of joint implementation as a means of meeting (or redefining) quantitative targets for
emission reductions. Individual countries have developed very general criteria, which vary quite a bit from
country to country. See Pilot Phase Report, supra note 169, at 6.
175.See Pilot Phase Report, supra note 169, at 5.
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2. Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol explicitly mentions provision of credits for projects undertaken abroad.176 The trading
arguably incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol makes it necessary to qualify statements about the quantitative limits
countries ostensibly accepted in the Protocol. To the extent the Protocol allows international trading, it may allow
countries to make less domestic reductions than the national quantitative limits seem to require, if they purchase
something deemed equivalent from elsewhere. This involves foregoing physical compliance, defined as literally
bringing the emissions in a country down to the lower level specified in the Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol,177
which spells out each developed countries' quantitative limits for greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, trading
involves "virtual" compliance without physical compliance.178
The Kyoto Protocol, however, does not clearly allow trading to justify a country's failure to physically
meet national quantitative reduction commitments. Article 3 simply restates the ambiguity found in the Framework
Convention, providing that developed countries "shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate carbon
dioxide equivalent emissions . . . do not exceed their assigned amounts" in Annex B. 179
Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol supports an interpretation that allows at least one form of trading to result
in virtual compliance. It states that countries that have agreed to fulfill their commitments jointly under Article 3
will be "deemed" in compliance when virtual compliance occurs.180 This provision was designed primarily to allow
the European Community to comply with a community-wide limit created through aggregation of the relevant

176.See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, arts. 6(1), 12(3)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 42.
177.See id. Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 42.
178.See id.
179.Id. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33 (emphasis added).
180.The Kyoto Protocol states:
Any parties included in Annex I that have reached an agreement to fulfill their commitments under article 3
jointly, shall be deemed to have met those commitments provided that their total combined aggregate
anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed
their assigned amounts calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction
commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of Article 3. The respective
emission level allocated to each of the Parties to the agreement shall be set out in that agreement. Id. art.
4(1), 37 I.L.M. at 34.
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national emission limitations.181
But another provision addressing more generalized emissions trading,182 Article 6, states that "the
acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes of meeting
commitments under Article 3."183 Article 17 reinforces this idea that emissions trading must be supplemental,
stating that "any . . . trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified
emission limitation and reduction commitments under that Article."184 The term "supplemental" could indicate
that countries must meet their quantified obligations through physical compliance, but may use credits to meet
basic non-quantified obligations or supplement compliance with the treaty.185

181.See Farhana Yamin, Developing Countries and Emission Trading, Address at Canada/U.S. Emissions
Trading Forum in Vancouver 5 (March 16END17, 1998) (unpublished manuscipt on file with the author);
Breidenich et al., supra note 100, at 321.
182.Some discussions of the issues in the Kyoto Protocol make a distinction between "emissions trading" on
the one hand and "joint implementation" on the other. See, e.g., Brendan P. McGivern, Introductory Note to
Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, 26 (treating trading under article 16 [article 17 in the revised
text] as emissions trading and trading under article 6 as "joint implementation"). This distinction obscures
the issues involved in any international transfer of credit for meeting greenhouse gas limitations and lacks
clarity. See id. (treating transactions under article 6 as an instance of "joint implementation"); Frank T.
Joshua, International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: Structure and Organization of the Emissions
Market 6 (1998) (draft unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (treating transactions under article 6
as emissions trading); Negotiators Optimistic on Treaty Including Emissions Trading, Joint
Implementation, NAT'L ENV'T DAILY (BNA), Dec. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAEVR
file (describing joint implementation as "a system of credit sharing for emission offset projectsEMDsuch as
planting treesEMDin developing countries that are sponsored by industrialized nations). The text of the treaty
does not define "joint implementation" and does not support the notion that an international consensus
exists about its meaning. This article will therefore use the term emissions trading to refer to any
arrangement involving a transfer of credits or obligations.
The distinction between trading and joint implementation arose after the first COP voted to ban
trading as a means of meeting quantitative commitments under the joint implementation provisions of the
Framework Convention. Under pressure from the United States to authorize such trades, early drafts of the
Kyoto Protocol contained proposals for both emissions trading and joint implementation, but never clearly
defined either term. See, e.g., Reports by the Chairmen of the Informal Consultations Conducted at the
Seventh Session of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate, FCCC/AGBM at 20END22, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/AGBM/1997/INF.1 (1997).
183.Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 6(1)(d), 37 I.L.M. at 35 (emphasis added).
184.Id. art. 17. Article 17 appeared as article 16 bis when the Kyoto Protocol first appeared on the
Framework Convention's web page and as reprinted in International Legal Materials. See 37 I.L.M. 22, 22
n.* (noting that I.L.M. text is reproduced from draft text from a visit to the web site on January 15, 1998);
Id. art. 17 (article 16 bis). The Secretariat subsequently made a technical correction to the text appearing on
the web page, renumbering this as article 17. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change Internet Web Site (visited June 18, 1998) <http://www.unfccc.de/fccc/docs/cop3/ 107a01.pdf>.
185.For example, under the Framework Convention developed countries have an obligation to protect and
enhance greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs independent of the quantitative obligations in the Kyoto
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The second sentence of Article 17, however, states that developed countries "may participate in emissions
trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3 of this Protocol."186 This would seem to
contradict a reading requiring complete physical compliance with quantitative obligations. This ambiguity reflects
the inability of the international community to reach consensus on whether trading should generate credits toward
compliance with developed country quantitative limits.187
The United States did not want to limit trading to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. It sought to
broaden trading to allow countries and/or their polluters to forego reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in
exchange for carrying out actions that protected or enhanced greenhouse gas sinks. 188 This might allow credit for
forestry projects similar to those American electric utilities implemented as pilot projects to demonstrate the
"feasibility" of "joint implementation."189
This idea goes beyond emissions trading to encompass environmental benefit trading, a concept which is a
more amorphous form of trading than emissions trading. Proponents of this broadened trading argue that trading
carbon sink preservation and enhancement for emission reductions is appropriate, because both play a role in
preventing climate change. The Kyoto Protocol may actually authorize this kind of generalized trading between
developed countries, but it requires an expert body to develop criteria to govern trading.190 For this reason, one

Protocol. See Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(2)(a), 31 I.L.M. at 856. They might use tradable
credits to satisfy these obligations.
186.Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 17.
187.See COP3 Summary, supra note 95, at 11END12; McGivern, supra note 181, at 26 ("The negotiations in
Kyoto nearly collapsed over the issue of emissions trading.").
188.See generally JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 187END94.
189.See William R. Moomaw, Achieving Joint Benefits from Joint Implementation, in CRITERIA, supra note
18, at 12 (describing tree planting as the "first and best known example of a joint implementation
strategy").
190.Article 6 provides that developed country parties may trade "emission reduction units" in order to meet
its quantitative emission reduction commitments. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 6, 37 I.L.M. at 35.
The term emission reduction units literally refers to emission reductions and not sink enhancement. See id.
Sink enhancement does not reduce emissions, rather it enhances or conserves the ability of greenhouse gas
"sinks" (such as forests) to ameliorate the damage from increased emissions. Forestry projects may tend to
remove carbon from the atmosphere thereby reducing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, but
they do not reduce "emissions"EMDthe release of gases into the atmosphere by polluters.
The context, however, shows that the parties intended to give the term a broader interpretation
than the literal language allows. Article 6 refers to "emission reduction units" resulting from "projects
aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks."
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cannot say that the agreement requires any absolute reductions in greenhouse gas emissions without appropriate
caveats. The agreement leaves open the possibility of substituting tree planting for otherwise required greenhouse
gas emission reductions.191
The United States also wished to expand trading to include trades between developed and developing
countries. The Kyoto Protocol generally rejected this proposal; Articles 3, 4, and 6 only authorize trading between
developed countries.192
But Article 12 establishes a limited exception to this decision not to endorse trades between developed and
developing countries. It allows developed countries to count "certified emission reductions" in meeting their
quantitative targets.193 Article 12 implies that these credits will come from projects carried out in developing
countries. Article 12 creates a "clean development mechanism" to certify these credits.194 It establishes this
mechanism's purpose as assisting developing countries "in achieving sustainable development and in contributing
to the ultimate objective of the Convention."195 And it provides that developing countries "will benefit from project

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 6, 37 I.L.M. at 35. Hence, projects enhancing forests' "anthropogenic"
carbon removal capacity may generate "emission reduction units" under the treaty, even though they
literally do not reduce emissions.
Article 3, sections 10 and 11 require the addition or subtraction of these "emission reduction units"
to countries' quantitative emission reduction obligations. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(10), (11), 37
I.L.M. at 34. Hence, these emission reduction units, which might include things other than emission
reductions, may count toward the quantitative emission limitations set out in Annex B of the Kyoto
Protocol.
191.Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol may allow parties to avoid domestic reductions to the extent it engages in
vigorous domestic tree planting. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(3), (4), 37 I.L.M. at 33.
192.Article 3 states that the "Parties included in Annex I," the developed countries, "shall individually or
jointly," reduce emissions. Id. art. 3, 37 I.L.M. at 33. Article 4 authorizes trading of commitments for "any
Parties included in Annex I." Id. art. 4, 37 I.L.M. at 34. Similarly, article 6 states:
\FNEXT1\For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party included in Annex I may
transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at
reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse
gases in any sector of the economy ._._._.\FNEXT1\
Id. art. 6, 37 I.L.M. at 35 (emphasis added); see Highlights supra note 159, at 2 (Chairman Estrada said
joint implementation between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties had been dropped).
193.Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 12(3)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 38.
194.Id. art. 12(1), (7), 37 I.L.M. at 38. For background on the negotiating history of this provision, see U.S.
Proposes New Funding Scheme for Joint Implementation Trading, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1525 (Dec. 5,
1997).
195.Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 12(2), 37 I.L.M. at 38.
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activities resulting in certified emission reductions."196 In order for projects to help developing countries in the
manner contemplated, they must be carried out in those countries.
While Article 12 authorizes geographically broad trading, it restricts some aspects of trading. In contrast
to Articles 3 and 6, which contemplate credit for forestry projects, Article 12 only authorizes credits for "emission
reductions."197
Furthermore, Article 12 requires that developed country purchasers of clean development credits fund
more than a simple transfer of emission reduction credits. It directs the COP to "ensure that a share of the proceeds
from certified" projects "cover administrative expenses" and help "developing country Parties that are particularly
vulnerable to" climate change's "adverse effects" to adapt.198 This may allow island states likely to suffer greatly
from sea level rise and increasingly frequent storms to benefit from purchases of reductions.
Finally, Article 12 requires these projects to have value going beyond the simple generation of credits.
Reductions must not only be "real" and measurable, but also bring "long-term benefits related to . . . climate
change."199
The provisions adopted in the Protocol do not provide clear answers to even the most basic questions
about joint implementation. Indeed, the delegates to the Kyoto Protocol recognized that the provisions they adopted
failed to address a number of crucial issues, including whether credits could be claimed for activities carried out
abroad, what entities may trade, monitoring issues, accounting issues, oversight, and methodologies for estimating
environmental benefits.200 Hence, important issues about the scope and nature of trading remain open after
Kyoto.201

196.Id. art. 12(3)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 38.
197.See id. art. 12(3)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 38.
198.Id. art. 12(8), 37 I.L.M. at 38.
199.Id. art. 12(5)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 38 (emphasis added).
200.See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Third Session, Decision 1/CP.3 FCCC/COP, 3d Sess.
at 5END6, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (1997) (requesting subsidiary bodies to guide the Secretary in
addressing inter alia various emissions trading issues at the fourth meeting of the COP in Buenos Aires in
1998).
201.See Searles, supra note 5, at 133, 135.
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3. The Free Lunch Theory of Trading
Many American scholars and government officials tend to view emissions trading as a free lunch, a
proposition with no significant downside.202 This probably helps explain the American government's enthusiastic
attitude toward international emissions trading. This subsection will explain the "free lunch" theory of emissions
trading.
Emissions trading offers the theoretical ability to achieve some environmental goals with less private
sector cost than traditional regulatory approaches.203 Suppose, for example, that a 100 ton reduction in aggregate
sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions could protect a lake from acid rain. Assume that two power plants, called Cheap
and Expensive, cause this problem and each emits 150 tons of SO2. If no other sources of this pollutant existed, the
government could address this problem by requiring each pollution source to reduce emissions by 50 tons. This
involves setting a uniform standard for an industrial category, an approach found in many environmental
statutes.204
Equalized emission reduction does not necessarily imply equalized cost, since one plant's equipment may
make pollution control more expensive than that of another. Suppose that Cheap has control costs of $1,000 per
ton, but that Expensive has control costs of $2,000 per ton. A uniform standard demanding fifty ton reductions
would then produce $150,000 in pollution control expenditures, $50,000 at Cheap ($1,000 X 50) and $100,000 at
Expensive ($2,000 X 50).
Suppose, however, that the government writes the same emission limitations, but allows the pollution
sources to trade reductions. Presumably, Expensive will pay Cheap to make fifty tons of reductions in its stead.
Cheap will cut its emission by 100 tons below its baseline level at a cost of $100,000 ($1,000 per ton X 100 tons).
Expensive will not cut its emissions at all. The public will secure the 100 tons of reduction needed to protect the

202.See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 172; Kyoto Meeting Ends With Agreement, Leaving
Details for 1998 in Buenos Aires, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1567 (Dec. 12, 1997) (Senator Robert Byrd states
that "emissions trading and `joint implementation' ._._. minimize economic pain and maximize the use of
new technologies.").
203.Driesen, supra note 2, at 312END13; Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 179.
204.See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 172END73; cf. Driesen, supra note 2, at 308, n.93 (arguing
that the commentators have exaggerated the dominance of the uniform standards approach). See, e.g., 33
U.S.C. §_1312 (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§_7411(a), 7412(d), 7521 (1994).
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lake from acidification, but the pollution sources will pay $100,000 instead of $150,000. In theory, emissions
trading offers a more cost effective means of meeting an environmental goal than a uniform standard, whenever
marginal costs vary between plants.
International trading of environmental benefits may tend to reduce the costs of complying with the
Climate Change Convention.205 The precise argument generally made about emissions trading, that trading saves
money relative to a uniform emissions standard,206 does not apply to the Climate Change Convention. For the
Protocol has assigned non-uniform national limits to each developed country's emissions. Hence, there is no
problem of uniform standards to overcome on the international level. Furthermore, the Climate Change
Convention does not require countries to use uniform emission standards to meet climate change goals. Countries
may choose carbon taxes, subsidies for advanced technologies, cooperative agreements with industry, domestic
emissions trading, non-uniform emission standards, uniform standards, or any other mechanism to reduce
emissions domestically under the Convention.
However, a slightly different argument for the proposition that trading saves money may apply. Countries
(or their nationals) will only trade if purchasing a credit from abroad costs less than implementing something at
home, whether or not the home reduction comes about because of a uniform emissions standard.207 For example,
President Clinton has proposed to subsidize innovative technology tending to reduce carbon dioxide emissions
through tax credits.208 The United States could reduce this investment and purchase credits for somebody else's
reduction abroad under the treaty.209 Accordingly, a variant of the argument most responsible for the free lunch
theory of emissions trading seems to apply to climate change. Emissions trading reduces the costs of meeting
emission reduction goals by allowing countries (or their nationals) to secure the cheapest possible emission
205.See Stavins, supra note 116, at 298END99.
206.See Driesen, supra note 2, at 312END13; Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 173, 179 (comparing the
economic efficiency of a trading system to a system based upon uniform standards).
207.Significant differences in marginal abatement costs may exist between countries. See Key Issues
Outlined for Upcoming Talks on International Emission Trading System, 21 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 414
(Apr. 29, 1998) (Costa Rica's minister of environment estimates that allowance prices in the industrialized
world will cost about $70 per ton, while costing only about $10 per ton in the developing world).
208.John H. Cushman Jr., Clinton Seeks Tax Credits for Fuel Savings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998, at A11.
209.See generally Wiser, supra note 169, at 760END61 (advocating a carbon tax with a credit against the tax
available for emission reduction credits earned abroad).
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reductions.210
But the parties to the Kyoto Protocol may already have taken cost-effectiveness into account by assigning
differentiated national caps on greenhouse gas emissions. To the extent the differentiation of national emission
limits already reflects consideration of cost effectiveness, implementation of the Protocol should not require much
reliance on emissions trading.211 Furthermore, even without international emissions trading, countries can lower
their compliance costs through the use of domestic economic incentive measures.212 So countries may lower costs
without international emissions trading.213
In spite of this, one can construct a justification for international emissions trading on cost-effectiveness
grounds. The individual national caps may reflect considerations other than comparative cost-effectiveness.
Alternatively, the cost-effectiveness estimates justifying the differentials may prove inaccurate in practice. In either
case, emissions trading should enhance the cost-effectiveness of delivering the reductions.
Similarly, even if national economic incentive programs lower compliance costs, additional opportunities
for cost savings may exist beyond the border. The existence of differentiated caps and authority to use national
economic incentive approaches may lessen the value of emissions trading, but they do not necessarily eliminate the
possibility of realizing some cost savings from emissions trading.214
Professors Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart have also argued that emissions trading combines
democratic accountability with the "market mechanism" of emissions trading.215 They claim that emissions trading

210.See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 161 (joint implementation can enhance the costeffectiveness of implementation measures "particularly where the marginal costs of response strategies"
differ from country to country).
211.The IPCC states that the initial allocation of emissions rights amongst nations does not affect global
abatement costs significantly. See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 339. This makes sense if one
assumes that all initial allocations will be traded until an optimum is reached anyway. But to the extent that
the initial allocation of rights already reflects cost-effectiveness considerations, the initial allocation will
accomplish what the trading system would otherwise seek to accomplish in theory, the production of more
reductions where reductions are cheaper.
212.See Stavins, supra note 116, at 302END07 (discussing domestic carbon taxes and tradable permits).
213.Id.
214.See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 338END40.
215.See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 171; cf. Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing
Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 303 (1995) (arguing that the history of the acid rain program does
not support the notion that emissions trading enhances democratic accountability).
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offers an opportunity to focus public attention on decisions about aggregate emission reductions, rather than more
arcane issues arising in environmental law.216 This helps explain their use of the "free lunch" metaphor.217 If a
"free market" approach also offers democratic accountability, perhaps no downside exists.
In fact, an emissions trading program must begin with some public body establishing emission
limitations; so a trading program does involve, more or less, democratic decisions.218 Professors Ackerman and
Stewart go further, however, and argue that emissions trading actually offers more democratic accountability than
traditional regulation.219 They reach this conclusion by comparing a hypothetical emissions trading program in
which Congress sets emission limitations to a traditional regulatory program in which an administrative body sets
limits for categories of pollution sources in arcane administrative rulemaking proceedings.220
Most writings on emissions trading also claim that trading tends to foster innovation.221 Commentators
rely on the fact that emissions trading creates an incentive for some pollution sources to make more reductions
than a regulator requires, because the owners of these "overcomplying" sources may sell these credits to other
pollution sources.222
An important question exists as to the proper scope of the free lunch theory of trading. Professor
Ackerman and Stewart articulated their free lunch theory in defense of an emissions trading program that capped

216.See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 189.
217.See id. at 171END72 (arguing that emissions trading combines better democratic debate with significant
savings and then suggesting that emissions trading is a free lunch because it is better "in terms of all
relevant public values").
218.See Driesen, supra note 2, at 324.
219.See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 171, 188END91 (economic incentives will vastly "improve the
quality of debate about environmental values").
220.Professors Ackerman and Stewart criticize "uniform" best available technology (BAT) regulations
because they "impose massive information gathering burdens on administrators." Id. at 174 (emphasis
supplied). They also criticize BAT because it tends to encourage industry to litigate in order to delay or
defeat "regulatory requirements." Id. They then state that emissions trading will enhance democratic debate
by focusing "Congressional debate ._._. upon the fundamental question" of how many pollution permits to
grant. Id. at 189.
221.See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 183 (emissions trading "promises to ._._. reward
innovative improvements in existing cleanup techniques.").
222.See Driesen, supra note 2, at 334.
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emissions at levels chosen by Congress.223 Indeed, they advocated a system in which polluters would have to buy
permits from the government.224 The government would limit the quantity of permits and hence the volume of total
emissions.225 This raises the question of whether the free lunch theory properly constitutes a theory about emissions
trading in general, or a theory about cap and trade programs.
The acid rain trading program capping sulfur dioxide emissions in order to address acid rain more closely
resembles the Ackerman/Stewart ideal than other emissions trading programs.226 The acid rain program has saved
money while significantly advancing environmental protection precisely because it caps emissions and requires
continuous emissions monitoring.227 As a result, the program seems likely to succeed in making significant
reductions in pollution while lowering costs.228 It therefore seems to vindicate the free lunch theory of emissions
trading as offering effective environmental protection at lower cost.
But perhaps not. Throughout the 1980s, United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
authorized state emissions trading programs that did not cap the overall mass of emissions.229 Instead, polluters
would secure credits in lieu of meeting source specific limits on emission rates.230 These programs often receive

223.Professors Ackerman and Stewart state that the trading system should force Congress to decide about
the "rate of change" of existing levels of pollution. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 189END90. This
necessarily implies a cap on emissions. Otherwise, it is possible to dictate outcomes at particular plants, but
not changes in overall emission levels. Caps are also implicit in their argument that a restricted supply of
pollution rights would be available. See id. at 186. See Driesen, supra note 2, at 326.
224.See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 178END83.
225.Id. at 186.
226.For a description of the acid rain program see David Driesen, Air Pollution Control, in POWELL,
TREATISE ON PROPERTY 865.5A[5] (1994); Brennan Van Dyke, Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid
Deposition, 100 YALE L.J. 2707 (1991); Nancy Kete, The U.S. Acid Rain Allowance Trading System, in
OECD, CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING A TRADABLE PERMIT SYSTEM 78END108 (1992).
227.See Driesen, supra note 2, at 317END19.
228.Id. at 318END19. I have questioned whether the emissions trading mechanism constitutes an adequate
explanation of the cost savings realized so far. See id.
229.See id. at 314END16 (describing some of these programs). I include "bubbles," which only authorize
trades between units within a plant as trading programs, even though a "bubble" limits the scope of trading
geographically. See id. at 313END16.
230.See Driesen, supra note 2, at 317END18.
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credit for saving pollution sources a lot of money.231 But these programs rarely produced the emissions reductions
that the non-trading programs they replaced called for. Indeed, many of them saved polluters money by allowing
them to hide the fact that they did nothing to reduce pollution.232
Since 1990, the EPA has not applied the lessons this mixed experience offers to its supervision of state
emissions trading programs. It has encouraged state programs without emission caps and without direct
monitoring of emissions.233 As a result, a number of states have written rules that may duplicate the failures of the
1980s, rather than emulate the potentially successful acid rain program.234
Government officials and a number of scholars may assume that the free lunch theory applies to all
trading programs. But it may only properly apply to programs that cap emissions and carefully monitor them.
Other kinds of programs may offer substantial cost savings for polluters with significant costs to the environment.
Such programs may resemble expensive, rather than free, lunches.
The free lunch theory of emissions trading claims that emissions trading (or perhaps only some emissions
trading programs) offers significant advantages over traditional environmental programs. These benefits include
lowered cost, superior incentives for innovation, and enhanced democratic process.

II. EMISSIONS TRADING AS A CHEAP FIX
Trading may help society meet short-term environmental goals more cheaply than traditional approaches.
This part asks whether a least cost solution to an immediate environmental objective necessarily constitutes the
best approach to a long-term environmental problem.
More specifically, this part questions the free lunch theory's claim that emissions trading tends to foster
innovation and advance democratic values. It argues that emissions trading has a tendency to delay innovation and
interfere with democratic accountability. Because of this, trading may hinder long-term progress, even if it does
reduce short-term costs. For these reasons, it may constitute a cheap fix, not a free lunch. This should affect policy

231.See id. at 313.
232.See id. at 314END16.
233.See id. at 320.
234.See id. at 320 n.149 (discussing some of the failed 1990s bubbles); MICH. ADMIN. CODE L.L.
336.2201END336.2218 (1998) (Michigan's recently adopted "open market" trading rule).
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makers' response to proposed trading programs.

A. Trading, Innovation, and the Future of the Climate Change Convention
This subsection will address the issue of innovation under the treaty. First, it will discuss the issue of
whether trading may tend to discourage innovation. Second, it will explain the importance of innovation to the
future of the treaty.
This article focuses on the emissions trading issue, not the issue of selecting the proper target for
reductions. This subsection asks whether international trading tends to foster innovation or facilitate its avoidance
for any given target.

1. Trading and Innovation
The Framework Convention envisions a process of innovation in developed countries, subsidized
technology transfer to developing countries, and the eventual assumption by all countries of adequate obligations to
avoid dangerous climate change. Trading may either contribute to or detract from this long-term process.
Many economists assume that emissions trading generates innovation, because trading encourages the
pollution source with the cheapest control options to make more reductions than the government requires of it in
order to sell credits to other sources for which emissions control is more expensive.235 These economists assume,
correctly, that making more reductions will generally require more innovation than making fewer reductions.
Accordingly, cheap sources wishing to sell credits to polluters with more expensive control options innovate more
than they would absent emissions trading. This argument focuses very narrowly on pollution sources with
relatively cheap control options and does not consider how emissions trading might effect innovation at the
pollution sources with relatively expensive control options.
Broadening the analysis to include all of the pollution sources eligible to trade casts grave doubts on the
theory that emissions trading encourages more innovation than a comparable traditional regulation, as some

235.See, e.g., Stavins, supra note 116, at 302END03 (describing emissions trading as promoting "dynamic
efficiency," i.e., technological innovation); Gary E. Marchant, Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An
Offset Policy for Slowing Global Warming, 22 ENVTL. L. 623, 630 (1992) (applying this reasoning to the
climate change problem).
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economists have realized.236 An emissions trading program creates two incentives: an incentive for the cheaper
facility to emit less pollution than the government will authorize; and an incentive for the more expensive facility
to emit more pollution than the government will authorize under a comparable traditional regulation.237 In
emissions trading, foregoing normally required emission reductions at plants with relatively expensive control
options finances "additional" reductions (reductions going beyond requirements) at cheaper facilities. 238 The
money saved by foregoing emission reductions at one facility finances the "extra" emission reductions at
another.239
At a minimum, this means that an emissions trading program decreases the incentives for innovations at
relatively expensive facilities, since operators of these facilities will emit more than they would under a comparable
uniform standard.240 These operators, who might have tried to innovate to escape expensive pollution control
requirements under a traditional performance standard, will tend to purchase credits instead.
Emissions trading may induce less net innovation than traditional regulation.241 The trading program
effectively lessens or eliminates the pollution control obligations of the sources having the greatest need for
innovation, those facing high control costs. It provides an incentive for low cost sources to make more reductions
than a regulation would otherwise require. But the low cost sources may meet their needs with conventional
technology, since achieving reductions for them is relatively cheap. Emissions trading, by shifting reductions from
high cost to low cost facilities, may weaken incentives for innovation, even while it generates short-term cost
savings.
Traditional regulation requires emission reductions from specifically targeted pollution sources. It does
not allow polluters to forego control of a targeted source in exchange for a reduction elsewhere. This locational

236.See, e.g., David A. Malueg, Emissions Credit Trading and The Incentive to Adopt New Pollution
Abatement Technology, 16 J. ENV'T ECON. & MAN. 52 (1987).
237.See Marchant, supra note 234, at 629 (emissions trading encourages "firms with lower marginal costs
of reducing pollution to reduce more emissions than firms with higher marginal costs.").
238.Driesen, supra note 2, at 337.
239.Id.
240.Id. at 334.
241.See Dubash, supra note 164, at 73END74 (joint implementation lessens the incentive to innovate).
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constraint may increase the need for innovation by requiring very focused pollution control efforts that might be
expensive absent innovation. Easing the spatial constraints of traditional regulation may make it easier to choose
some standard technology at a pollution source where control costs are inexpensive, rather than encourage
innovation. If countries trade a large volume of environmental benefits under the Climate Change Convention, this
may impede innovation for similar reasons.
Developed countries, if required to make substantial domestic reductions in greenhouse gas emissions,
may induce substantial innovation.242 Indeed, President Clinton has announced an implementation strategy
designed to encourage innovation in the United States. In particular, his policy seeks to encourage development of
very energy efficient vehicles, renewable energy, and energy conservation. Other countries have announced
strategies to induce similar changes, using a wide variety of fiscal, regulatory, and social mechanisms.243
Implementation of these packages, however, may provoke resistance, especially if policies encourage use of
innovative technologies that may displace lucrative existing technologies.
Trading offers a country the opportunity to make less domestic change to the degree it purchases credits
abroad. Since innovation often involves significant initial costs, trading may create an economic incentive to
deploy existing technology abroad in lieu of innovation at home.244
Suppose, for example, that an American electric utility faces emission limitations stringent enough to
force it to increase reliance on renewable energy sources and fuel cells.245 Given an international trading option,
the utility may earn equivalent credits building a coal-burning power plant using standard technologies in a
country that burns coal directly to heat buildings, cook, and power small industries.246 Or it may retrofit an existing

242.See Woodward, supra note 15, at 217 (many nations look to the United States for leadership and
innovative technology in addressing climate change).
243.See, e.g., When Virtue Pays a Premium, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 1998, at 57 [hereinafter Virtue]
(referring to Sweden's carbon tax and Germany's subsidy of wind power).
244.See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 75END76.
245.Renewable energy sources include solar energy, biomass, hydropower, and geothermal power. See
IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 589, 602END16. Fuel cells convert chemical energy into electricity without
burning fossil fuels. See id. at 594; see also Matthew L. Wald, Fuel Cell Will Supply All Power to a Test
House, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1998, at A28.
246.See IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 596. Coal is the most carbon intensive fossil fuel. See IPCC
DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 241.
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dirty coal-fired power plant abroad.247 Even if use of standard technology abroad produces equivalent emission
reductions at less cost than domestic reductions, the use of standard technology does nothing to support the process
of developing renewable energy resources or advanced technologies.248 It consequently does nothing to change the
cost differential that prevents the widespread deployment of technologies with much lower emissions.249 More
initially expensive investments in developing and applying renewable energy might lower this cost differential over
time; past investments have already substantially lowered the cost of producing renewable energy.250 A decision to
retrofit a Russian power plant (for example) resembles homeowner's decision to patch a leaky spot on the roof,
rather than to begin building a new roof capable of withstanding future storms.
Trading may not only discourage the up-front investment in innovation necessary to develop new
technologies with some initial costs, it may lead to avoidance of inexpensive but institutionally difficult energy
efficiency improvements. Wide agreement exists that fairly large cuts in greenhouse gas emissions are available at
little or no net cost through investments in energy efficiency, which tend to reduce consumption of fossil fuels and
associated greenhouse gas emissions.251 Many energy efficiency improvements tend to produce enough savings in
fuel costs to finance the initial cost of introducing greater efficiency.

247.See Chris Rolfe, An Environmental Perspective on International Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading
(visited May 10, 1998) <http://www.vcn.bc.ca/wcel/wcelpub/1998/12249.html>.
248.For a general review of available and advanced technological options for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions see IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 589END640. See also IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at
329 (a special effort is necessary to reverse the strong tendency for fossil fuel technology to become the
major future supply source for developing countries).
249.See Wald, supra note 244, at A28 (the idea of fuel cells has been around for 100 years, but until
recently fuel cells were too expensive for every day applications.).
250.See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 242 (costs of renewable energy are falling partly because of
"learning effects" and "economies of scale"). See, e.g., Honda Sets Goal of Zero Waste Discharges,
Greenhouse Gas Cuts at All Domestic Sites, 21 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 428 (Apr. 29, 1998) (Honda
announces a solar electric power generation system that reduces power generation costs substantially);
Wald, supra note 244, at A28 (explaining that fuel cell costs are falling and are expected to fall further,
especially if mass produced).
251.See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 12END13 (citing agreement that energy efficiency gains of 10%
to 30% above baseline trends is available over the next two to three decades at negative to zero net cost and
that greater free improvements are available over longer time scales); see also ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY
ET AL., ENERGY INNOVATIONS: A PROSPEROUS PATH TO A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT (1997) (making policy
recommendations designed to realize a large amount of reductions while accomplishing a net savings of $58
billion by 2010).
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Substantial institutional barriers make it difficult to implement these inexpensive reductions.252 The actual
free market economy, as opposed to the perfect market economists model, often fails to realize cost saving emission
reductions. Energy efficiency investments that save money for the society as a whole over a long period of time do
not necessarily appear economic to the people in a logical position to make investments. For example, a
homeowner may not invest in insulation, energy efficient lighting, and energy efficient appliances that would more
than pay for themselves in a few years. The homeowner may not have the resources to make the required up-front
investment or may not plan to live in a house long enough to realize the full return on the investment.
Similarly, cultural factors, not just costs, help explain the increased use of passenger cars in the United
States, which contributes to climate change.253 Reversing this increase would no doubt require politically difficult
changes, even if a shift to mass transit were economically attractive.254
In many cases, realizing free or very inexpensive "no regrets" options requires significant institutional
reforms that require political effort.255 Government officials may find it easier to realize more expensive reductions
abroad, than to realize cheap reductions at home that require political and cultural change.
The broader the universe of trading opportunities, the greater the potential to find cheap fixes that avoid
long-term investments.256 In crafting agreements about trading, the international community faces important issues

252.See Rolf Selrod & Asbjorn Torvanger, What Might the Minimum Requirements for Making the
Mechanism of Implementation Under the Climate Change Convention Credible and Operation, in
OPPORTUNITIES AND APPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 8 (discussing the existence of institutional and
other barriers to "no regrets" (i.e. profitable) options).
253.See Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
141, 160END74 (1998). Economic cost also plays a role. See id. at 165 (citing the drop in the cost of auto
travel as a key reason for increased vehicle use).
254.See id. at 190END98 (explaining the reasons for the failure of an employee trip reduction program in the
Clean Air Act).
255.The term "no regrets" refers to measures that would address climate change, but would be worth doing
anyway, even if no climate change problem existed, usually for economic reasons. IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra
note 15, at 15 n.2.
256.Even if the Climate treaty did nothing to authorize international trading, countries could employ
domestic emissions trading to meet their national limits for greenhouse gas emissions. This would allow
developed countries, the only countries with quantitative limits under the Kyoto Protocol, to reduce their
costs of meeting greenhouse gas limitations. This would allow some avoidance of innovation. But to the
extent reasonably easy things are already being done, some industries might have to innovate in order for a
country to meet its limit.
If one can only trade emission reductions with the OECD countries, then one can only avoid
innovation until the limits of existing technologies are exhausted in all of these technically advanced
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about the appropriate geographic breadth of trading and about which countries may trade. The degree of the threat
to innovation depends on the particulars of the law governing trading. Geographically broad trading opportunities
to realize credits for using standard technologies or planting trees may facilitate avoidance of investments in
energy efficiency and renewable energy.

2. The Importance of Innovation under the Climate Change Convention
Avoidance of innovation would have important consequences for the future of the treaty. As explained
above, the Convention relies upon innovation from developed countries to meet its goals. Article 2 of the Kyoto
Protocol explicitly encourages one type of innovation of special importance to climate change, increased use of
"new and renewable forms of energy" in developed countries.257 Article 2 also encourages developed countries to
make other changes relevant to energy policy that may require innovations, namely "enhancement of energy
efficiency" and measures limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the transport sector.258
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, an international panel of scientists charged with
assessing the environmental and socio-economic impact of climate change,259 identified reducing reliance upon

countries. This may allow more deferral of innovation than a purely domestic trading regime would allow.
But since these countries are also advanced, and they have capped greenhouse gas emissions under the
Kyoto Protocol, limits on greenhouse gas emissions might continue to drive some innovation.
If one can trade with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the opportunities to avoid
innovation become much greater. These countries have extremely dirty and antiquated means of producing
power, including coalEND burning power plants with very high carbon dioxide emissions. See Ryszard
Janikowski et al., Joint Implementation Projects Between the Netherlands and Poland, in JOINT
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 133 (describing Polish emission sources). This means that western
countries can purchase emission reduction credits by helping to "modernize" existing power plants with
current standard western technologies. Extending trading to developing countries would increase the
opportunities to avoid innovation enormously, since so many developing countries could reduce emissions
by retrofitting existing older facilities.
Allowing credit for tree planting also expands the opportunities to avoid innovation. The wider the
area in which once can escape emission reduction obligations through tree planting, the greater the
innovation avoidance potential.
257.Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 2(1)(a)(iv), 37 I.L.M. at 32.
258.Id. art. 2(1)(a)(i), (v), 37 I.L.M. at 33.
259.See Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, G.A. Res. 53, U.N.
GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 133END34, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53 (1988). For background on the
formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), see Bodansky, supra note 2, at
463END65; see also Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 21(2), 31 I.L.M. at 870 (providing for
cooperation between the interim Secretariat of the Convention and the IPCC).
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inefficient use of fossil fuels as important to meeting climate change goals in a manner consistent with nations'
economic aspirations.260 If population and energy consumption both increase worldwide, then continued reliance
on inefficient burning of fossil fuels will increase, not decrease, worldwide emissions of carbon dioxide.261 Hence,
in the long run, reducing emissions while accommodating population growth and economic development requires
reduced reliance upon inefficient fossil fuel consumption.262 This necessarily implies deploying alternative
renewable energy and improving energy efficiency.263
Society tends to rely on fossil fuel burning to generate energy, because fossil fuel traditionally costs less
than renewable forms of energy.264 Policies tending to perpetuate this cost differential pose a serious barrier to
reducing reliance on fossil fuels, especially for developing countries.265 The Kyoto Protocol recognizes this and
recommends that developed countries phase out fiscal incentives in the "greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run
counter to" the Convention's objectives.266 The United States, for example, actually subsidizes fossil fuel burning
through a wide variety of fiscal measures, including the oil depletion allowance and other tax breaks for the coal
and oil industries.267
In addition, decisions to retrofit old plants or build new coal-fired power plants abroad may actually make

260.See IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 39END49; see also IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 229END31
(discussing costs of these options); Hodas, supra note 170, at 92 (developing country state-of-the-art energy
efficiency and renewable energy investments essential to economic growth without increased fossil fuel use).
261.See IPCC DIMENSIONS, supra note 15, at 236.
262.See IPCC, RADIATIVE FORCING, supra note 92, at 266 ("[F]ossil fuel CO2 emissions contribute more to
current and potential future climate change than any other single gas released by any other single human
activity."); see also id. at 270 (assumptions about population and per capita income "are important sources
of differences in projected emissions.").
263.See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 466 (Anthony D'amato & Kirsten Engel eds.,
1996).
264.See Cleaner Energy, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 1998, at 17.
265.See id. (explaining how carbon taxes might help reduce carbon dioxide emissions).
266.Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 2(1)(a)(v), 37 I.L.M. at 33.
267.See Gelbspan, supra note 107, at 27 (calling for redirection of the $21 billion the United States invests
in subsidizing fossil fuels and listing some of the subsidies); Beard, supra note 56, at 201 (stating that the
United States provides tax breaks and other subsidies to producers of coal, oil, natural gas, and uranium).
Other countries also subsidize fossil fuels. See, e.g., Cleaner Energy, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 1998, at 17
(Germans pay a mandatory premium on electric bills to support the coal industry).
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it harder to switch to cleaner technologies once they become available. Once investors make fresh investments in
older plants, they may want to keep these plants running for a long time in order to maximize the return from these
sunk costs. However, countries may invest in cleaner renewable energy and avoid costly retrofits or fresh
investments in dirty old technology if they have cleaner technologies available.
Innovation tends to reduce costs in the long run.268 Innovations tending to bring down the cost of
renewable energy269 and improve energy efficiency may be essential to meeting the Framework Convention's
objective of avoiding dangerous climate change.270
Lowering costs through innovation, however, does not constitute a free lunch. Typically technological
innovation follows investment, sometimes costly investment, in researching, developing, and deploying new
technologies.271 Similarly, realizing opportunities to improve energy efficiency, even when profitable, may require
difficult institutional changes that government officials may find challenging.
Long-term societal benefits that accrue from the development of cleaner technologies may involve some
short-term costs for some sectors.272 Cheaper, cleaner power and more efficient energy use may harm producers of
more expensive, dirtier fossil fuels.273 Most progress involving any kind of technological change produces some
winners and some losers.274

268.See, e.g., Wirth, supra note 12, at 2657 (noting cost saving potential of energy efficiency and
conservation).
269.See Virtue supra note 242, at 57 ("[R]enewables are becoming less expensive.").
270.See Gelbspan, supra note 107, at 22END26 (arguing that effectively addressing climate change requires a
switch from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources); Irving M. Mintzer, Institutional Options and
Operational Challenges in the Management of a Joint Implementation Regime in CRITERIA, supra note 18,
at 47END48 (focusing joint implementation exclusively on the cheapest reduction options "will delay the
development of technologies with the potential for the large emissions reductions that will be needed over
the long term for stabilizing atmospheric concentrations" of greenhouse gases).
271.See generally Mintzer, supra note 269 (describing increased corporate investment in renewables); JOHN
L. BERGER, CHARGING AHEAD: THE BUSINESS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY AND WHAT IT MEANS TO AMERICA
(1997).
272.See Stewart, supra note 59, at 1376 (discussing scrapping of "embedded political and social capital in
existing institutions").
273.See generally Gelbspan, supra note 107, at 22END27 (discussing, inter alia, fossil fuel purveyors' efforts
to derail efforts to address climate change effectively).
274.See Stewart, supra note 59, at 1376 (discussing transitional costs accompanying technological change).
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Societal decisions to make these kinds of investments may resemble, in some respects, a homeowner's
decision to buy a new roof. Even if buying a new roof saves money in the long run, it involves higher short-term
costs than just patching it.

3. Disrupting the Normative Community Through Violation of the Leadership Principle
Avoiding innovation may conflict with the leadership principle. This may have important consequences
for future treaty development. As explained above, the Framework Convention features an agreement that
developed countries will provide leadership through innovation and technological transfer. This forms an essential
predicate to future agreements to make further progress.
Trading increases the risk that countries and industries that have the capacity to develop new technologies
will fail to do so. This failure will make it more difficult, as a practical matter, for developing countries to agree to
significant cuts in the future. With innovative technologies available, developing countries can agree to future
emission reductions without having to drastically reduce already low levels of consumption.
Emissions trading may also make future emission reductions more expensive for countries that generate
credits for joint implementation.275 These countries may exhaust cheap emission reduction opportunities in their
efforts to sell joint implementation credits.276 This may raise the price of future emission reductions in the credit
generating countries.277
Moreover, developing countries may see trading as a betrayal of the Framework Convention's
principles.278 In the Framework Convention, the international community agreed that adopted norms, including the
leadership principle, would shape future conduct.279 To the extent the most powerful countries force subsequent
agreements to depart from these norms, developing countries may feel little obligation to comply with the norms

275.See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 76.
276.See id.; see also Prodipto Ghosh et al., Perspectives of Developing Countries on Joint Implementation,
in OPPORTUNITIES AND APPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 26END27.
277.See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 76.
278.See id. at 182 (discussing objections to "principle of joint implementation").
279.See generally KRATOCHWIL, supra note 7, at 70 (stating that norms rule out certain methods of goal
seeking). Different disciplines use the term "norm" in different ways. See Cooter, supra note 8, at 1656. I
use it to refer to obligations. See id. at 1656END57 (endorsing this use of the term of legal discussions).
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that might demand a lot of them.280
More concretely, the overarching norm of "common but differentiated responsibilities" reflects an
expectation that developed countries will provide leadership, and that developing countries will make substantial
clean-up commitments in the future. If developing countries believe that developed countries have not exercised the
required leadership, they may be more reluctant to assume serious commitments in the future.281 Developing
countries may correctly conclude that developed countries have not complied with the leadership principle if they
trade frequently enough to avoid innovation.
This does not establish that all purchases of credits inherently conflict with the leadership principle.
International trading rules that only allow credits for innovative projects could assure that trading did not
undermine innovation. These rules could allow countries to earn credits through subsidizing renewable energy
abroad, but disallow credits earned through retrofitting coal burning power plants, for example. Even trading that
does not discourage innovation, however, might still conflict with the leadership principle. After all, the leadership
principle calls on developed countries to assume greater reduction responsibilities. To the extent a developed
country chooses to purchase reduction credits abroad in lieu of making reductions at home, it has arguably avoided
the differentiation of responsibilities called for in the Framework Convention.282
On the other hand, a trading proponent might argue that the developed country has assumed greater
emission reduction responsibilities than the developing country to the extent the developed country paid for the

280.See IPCC IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 83 ("The concept of equity is prominent in the Framework
Convention on Climate Change because of the need to gain a widespread audience."); Chinese Official Says
Western Nations Attempting to Shirk Climate Responsibility, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) d8 (Dec. 10, 1997);
Companies Encouraged to Participate in Pilot Phase of Joint Implementation, Int'l Env't Daily (BNA) d2
(May 25, 1995) (discussing perception among developing countries that developed countries will use joint
implementation to shirk their responsibilities).
281.Indeed, the developing countries have insisted that they are not yet willing to assume reduction
commitments, in part, because the developed countries have not met the national emission stabilization
target they agreed to in the Framework Convention. See Yamin, supra note 180, at 1END2.
282.See Environment Minister Faults U.S. Policy Emissions Trading on Eve of Kyoto Talks, Nat'l Env't
Daily (BNA) (Dec. 2, 1997), available in LEXIS, BNA library, BNAENV file (French Minister of
Environment and Territorial Development stating that Kyoto "had not been called to enable `rich polluting
nations to pay poorer nations for their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions'." ); Pier Vellinga &
Roebijn Heintz, Joint Implementation: A Phased Approach, in CRITERIA, supra note 18, at 5 (arguing that
joint implementation could allow developed countries to "buy their way out of their obligation to take the
lead in combating climate change").
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foreign emission-reducing activity.283 Arguably, the developed country may exercise leadership by paying for a
reduction, regardless of its location.284
This argument might make sense if the leadership principle only required a differentiation of emission
reduction commitments. After all, the differing economic capacities of nations helped justify the Framework
Convention's differentiation of responsibilities in the first place. 285 To the extent that developed countries finance
more reductions than developing countries, perhaps they have exercised the required leadership in reducing
emissions.286
But the leadership principle calls for financial help and technology transfer as well. More concretely, the
Framework Convention requires developed countries to fund the "full incremental cost" of developing country
compliance with the treaty, and to fund needed technology transfers.287 This means that trading with developing
countries conflicts with the leadership principle. This type of trading enables a developed country to claim credit
for meeting a required financial leadership obligation, which in turn justifies less leadership from the developed
country in emission reductions. Thus, a developed country that trades with developing countries does not offer the
leadership that the treaty calls for. For the treaty requires the full complement of emissions reductions and
financial assistance from developed countries.
Emissions trading with developing countries also involves double counting, which is detrimental to the
environment.288 Without trading, developed country compliance with the treaty generates two sets of reductions:
reductions from projects developed countries finance in developing countries and reductions developed countries

283.This would comport with the principle that those who have the most resources should contribute the
most to a common effort to address a problem. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INSTITUTIONS 390 (1995) (attributing this principle to the philosopher Henry Shue).
284.See Vellinga & Heintz, Joint Implementation: A Phased Approach, in CRITERIA, supra note 18, at 9
(investment in joint implementation pilot projects "can be considered" a form of leadership).
285.See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 479END80, 503 (explaining that OECD countries believed that this
difference in capacity justified differential treatment of developed and developing countries).
286.On the other hand, developing countries believe that the differences in historical emissions justify
different treatment. See id. at 480, 503. Under this view, it is not clear why escape from domestic
obligations through purchasing of credits would be justified.
287.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(3-5), 31 I.L.M. at 858.
288.Experts on joint implementation agree that double counting is undesirable and should be avoided. See,
e.g., JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 51.
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(or their nationals) make at home. Trading allows the developed country (or its nationals) to take credit for
reductions financed abroad to justify not making required reductions at home. This involves double counting
reductions made abroad to satisfy both the financial and domestic emission reduction obligations. Since this
generates only one set of reductions instead of two, the double counting trading fosters generates less net reductions
than the treaty calls for.289
Developed country financing of projects in developing countries does constitute financing of treaty
compliance. The Framework Convention obligates developing countries to adopt measures "addressing"
greenhouse gas emissions and sinks.290 Any project that could arguably create credits addresses greenhouse gas
emissions and sinks. Hence, developed countries fulfill their obligation to finance treaty compliance when they
finance projects in developing countries. And claiming credits for this financing does constitute double counting,
as described above.
The COP has made one decision that might address this issue. In 1995, the COP agreed that "the
financing of activities implemented jointly shall be additional to the financial obligations of" developed countries
under the Framework Convention.291 The developed countries already have a financial obligation to finance the
"full agreed incremental cost" of the developing countries' very general obligation to address greenhouse gas
emissions and sink removals under Article 4.292 Hence, this restriction could bar joint implementation with
developing countries altogether.

289.Professor Tsjalle van der Burg addresses a related problem in JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161,
at 81END84. He argues that a government sponsored joint implementation project meets an "additionality"
requirement if "it is not acceptable according to the investment criteria of the government." Id. at 84. He
does not address the question of how to define the "investment criteria" of a government with sufficient
precision to separate additional from non-additional projects. This criteria surely should assume that the
government fully meets its treaty obligations to fund the agreed incremental cost of projects needed to
comply with the treaty. Interpreted this way, only funding going beyond the incremental cost of treaty
compliance would meet the additionality requirement.
The Kyoto Protocol adopted a concept of additionality much narrower than that advocated by
Professor Tsjalle van der Burg. Accordingly, the Kyoto Protocol's additionality requirement does not by
itself solve the double counting problem identified above, even if Professor van der Burg's broader concept
of additionality, as interpreted here, would address this adequately.
290.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(1)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 855.
291.Pilot Phase Decision, supra note 168, at 19.
292.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(1)(b)(2), (3), 31 I.L.M. at 854.
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One could argue that this financial "additionality" language (requiring that projects funded for credit be
additional to those that developed countries must finance) only applies to projects undertaken without earning
credits during the pilot phase. This language comes from the COP decision establishing a pilot phase of joint
implementation in which no party would earn credits and the international community would evaluate the
feasibility of joint implementation for credit.293 But this restriction on financial double counting applies to
"activities implemented jointly," not just to activities implemented jointly under the pilot program.294 Hence, the
language may apply to all activities implemented jointly, including subsequent projects for credit. Other sentences
in the same decision expressly limit themselves to activities undertaken during the pilot phase. This suggests that
the COP knew how to limit its decisions to pilot phase projects when it wanted, but did not do so with respect to
the financial additionality requirement.295
Assuming that this financial additionality requirement does apply to joint implementation generally
(which seems likely), it may still allow some joint implementation for credit. Other language in the same decision
specifically authorizes joint implementation of activities in developing countries, at least during the pilot phase.296
This would seem inconsistent with reading the financial additionality requirement to prohibit joint implementation
altogether.
On the other hand, if the COP allows any trade with developing countries, it may not really address this
problem of conflict with the leadership principle.297 For developed countries should fund the full agreed
incremental cost of any project addressing climate change under the Framework Convention's terms.
The conflict between funding projects in developing countries for credit and the leadership principle may
strike some policy makers as formalistic. After all, developed countries have not always provided all of the funds

293.See Pilot Phase Decision, supra note 168, at 19.
294.Id. (The COP decided "that the financing of activities implemented jointly shall be additional to the
financial obligations of Parties included in Annex I ._._._.").
295.See id.
296.See id. (The COP decided "to establish a pilot phase for activities implemented jointly among Annex I
Parties and, on a voluntary basis, with non-Annex I Parties that so request.").
297.The Kyoto Protocol does establish a Clean Development Mechanism to certify projects in developing
countries that may generate credits. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 12, 37 I.L.M. at 38. Hence, the
policy issue addressed in the COP decision remains relevant to the implementation of this provision.
Furthermore, the United States may seek broader authority to trade with developing countries.
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that the Framework Convention requires.298 Most countries face political and budgetary constraints that make full
funding difficult.299 Emissions trading may tap a new source of financingEMDprivate sector moneyEMDsince
polluters can earn credits by funding emission reductions abroad.300
As a practical matter, however, funding projects abroad for credit does not augment the effort to address
climate change. Generating credits makes compliance with existing developed country obligations cheaper, since
the purchaser uses a project's reductions in emissions to justify doing less at home. By contrast, funding that
generates emission reductions without credits (as envisioned by the financial assistance provisions) generates
reductions in developing countries, which are in addition to those that the developed countries make at home.
Furthermore, treating the obligation to fund full incremental cost as merely a formalistic requirement may
undermine the normative community that must develop the treaty.301 Claiming credits for activities that developed
countries had promised to perform without credits amounts to treating the funding obligation as a mere technicality
of no importance. But this funding commitment forms part of the normative structure that led the developing
countries to accept common (albeit differentiated) responsibilities.302 Undermining this norm may lessen

298.See Decision 9/CP.2: Communications from Parties Included in Annex I to the Convention:
Guidelines, Schedule and Process for Consideration, FCCC/COP, 2nd Sess., at 17 U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 (1996) (recognizing "need to address the concern" that developed countries listed
in Annex II are failing to meet their commitments to technology transfer and funding); Laura H. Kosloff,
Climate Change Mitigation and Sustainable Development, 12 FALL NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 93, 96
(1997) (stating that budget contraints may cause governments to reallocate existing aid, rather than
augment net developmental assistance to address climate change).
299.See generally Irving M. Mintzer, Institutional Options and Operational Challenges in the Management
of a Joint Implementation Regime in CRITERIA, supra note 18, at 47 (discussing the decline in funds
available for public expenditures [as of 1994]).
300.See William R. Moomaw, Achieving Joint Benefit from Joint Implementation, in CRITERIA, supra note
18, at 13; Sid Embree, Investing in Less Greenhouse Gas Intensive Development: What Joint
Implementation Could Be?, in OPPORTUNITIES AND APPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 90END91. Sid
Embree argues that joint implementation will not disrupt other aid flows. See id. But the problem raised
above is more fundamental. Surely if the developed countries are fully meeting their obligations under the
Climate Change Convention, little need should exist for joint implementation. Implicitly repudiating this
obligation remains a problem.
301.I use the term "normative community" to capture the idea that those involved in creating the
international regime governing climate change share a set of expectations and some knowledge that
contributes to the evolution of legal norms developing the regime. See generally JURGIELEWICZ, supra note
8 at 100END08 (describing international legal regimes); Rose, supra note 7, at 32 (discussing how stories of
a common past and history may help persuade "a social and moral community" to cooperate in resource
management).
302.See GUPTA, supra note 160, at 119 (Brazilian officials called joint implementation "fraudulent and
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developing countries' sense that they have an obligation to comply with the part of the norm that poses political
difficulties for them.303
Trading away this obligation to fund adds insult to the injury of any funding shortfalls. 304 Providing
inadequate funding obviously undermines the treaty's effectiveness. But countries understand that a failure to fully
meet an obligation does not amount to a repudiation of the obligation.305 Creating a structure that fails to treat the
obligation seriously, however, comes perilously close to repudiation and may therefore undermine the entire
regime.306

B. Trading and Democratic Accountability
Proponents of the free lunch theory of emissions trading suggest that trading enhances democratic
decision-making by focusing public attention on the right question, the quantity of desired total emission
reductions.307 Public decision-making, however, can focus on the total quantity of net emission reductions whether
or not the government chooses to use emissions trading as a means of meeting the chosen quantity of emission
reductions.308

dishonest" while pointing out that developed countries have an obligation to transfer technology under the
Framework Convention.).
303.See generally Activities Implemented Jointly under the Pilot Phase: Submission by the Group of 77 and
China, Note by the Secretariat, FCCC/SBSTA, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/1997/Misc. Doc. 5
(1997).
304.In order to address this problem some have proposed only allowing joint implementation after investing
countries have allocated .7% of their GNP to official development assistance. See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION,
supra note 161, at 49.
305.See KRATOCHWIL, supra note 7, at 63 (discussing the importance of the justification and explanation
for violations of treaty regimes).
306.Nazrov Dubash has argued that the existence of joint implementation opportunities will increase the
incentives to inadequately fund the financial mechanism under the Framework Convention. See Nazrov K.
Dubash, Commoditizing Carbon: Social and Environmental Implications of Joint Implementation, in
OPPORTUNITIES AND APPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 77.
307.See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 189 (when environmental statutes come up for revision,
citizens may focus on the question of the appropriate quantitative reduction in pollution rights).
308.See Driesen, supra note 2, at 328 (explaining that Congress enacted quantitative limits on pollution in
several places in the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act).
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The free lunch theory's narrow focus upon democratic decision-making ignores the issue of democratic
accountability for implementing public decisions.309 I have argued elsewhere that emissions trading may layer the
complexities of emissions trading, which usually are formidable, on top of the complications involved in setting
and enforcing emission limitations.310 This complexity may make citizen participation in designing and
implementing an emissions trading program even more difficult than citizen participation in designing and
implementing a comparable traditional regulation written by the same institution. To evaluate the issue of
democratic accountability for implementing decisions made in the international arena, we need some
understanding of enforcement and democratic accountability in that setting.
In order for an international environmental regime to succeed, three steps must take place. First, a group
of states must create international law. Professor Harold Koh refers to this as "norm" enunciation.311 Second,
nations must adopt national laws and programs to implement the internationally agreed upon norms.312 Third, the

309.While Ackerman and Stewart fail to discuss public involvement in implementation of agreed upon
reductions, they do discuss enforcement from a bureaucratic perspective. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra
note 4, at 181END183. They argue that the auction of rights to pollute would increase the incentives for
agencies to effectively monitor and enforce pollution laws. See id. As I have pointed out elsewhere, this
argument does not necessarily apply to trading systems without an auction of pollution rights. See Driesen,
supra note 2, at 320END21 n.150. I have also argued that this argument does not withstand careful analysis
in light of the history of emissions trading. See id. Environmentalists have secured effective monitoring of
sulfur dioxide emissions in the acid rain program by bargaining hard for it as a condition for supporting the
program. In most other cases, emissions trading has proceeded without adequate monitoring.
310.See Driesen, supra note 2, at 329END30; see also Barry D. Nussbaum, Phasing Down Lead in Gasoline
in the United States, in OECD CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING A TRADABLE PERMIT SYSTEM 27END28 (1992)
(explaining why bubbles are more complex than traditional regulations).
311.Koh, Why Nations Obey?, supra note 119, at 2639 (discussing norm "enunciation" or "interpretation").
See generally Koh, Transnational, supra note 119. This norm enunciation step constitutes one step of a
three phase legal process through which nations come to obey international legal rules. See Koh, Why
Nations Obey?, supra note 119, at 2646. Professor Koh plans to elaborate on this process in a forthcoming
book. See id. at 2646 n.237. This article's legal process description is intended to describe fairly simply
what must occur for an international environmental regime to function. I make no claim to provide a
universally applicable description of international legal process. Indeed, international environmental law
may be different from other international legal regimes in that it requires not just restraints on state action,
but effective affirmative state actions to secure private actions affirmatively contributing to the objectives of
international agreements. See JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 111END12 (discussing the generation of norms
through international regimes).
312.See Koh, Transnational, supra note 119, at 204 ("Law-abiding states internalize international law by
incorporating it into their domestic legal and political structures._._. .") [emphasis in original]; T HOMAS M.
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 373END76 (1995) (discussing relationship
between international law and national action).
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national laws and programs must induce private actions that protect the environment.313 One can evaluate a
substantive international legal regime's ability to foster democratic accountability based on its tendency to hinder or
help public efforts to hold officials responsible for: (1) adequate international norm enunciation; (2) national
compliance; and (3) private actions implementing the norms.314
Emissions trading may interfere with accountability in several ways. First, it may disrupt the process of
translating general international goals into specific concrete national commitments.315 Second, it may make it more
difficult to hold government officials accountable for meeting agreed upon national commitments. Finally, it may
undermine the overarching international principle of national responsibility for private sector emissions emanating
from a country's territory, an important overarching international norm tending to support accountability. Below, I
discuss these threats to democratic accountability in the context of the Climate Change Convention.

1. The Trading Idea as an Impediment to Making Specific Commitments
Many international treaties fail to realize their objectives because they do not articulate precise enough
international law.316 This lack of precision may make it difficult to hold national officials accountable for favoring

313.See JAMES CAMERON, JACOB WERKSMAN, & PETER RODERICK, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 53 (1996).
314.See Weiss, supra note 25, at 695END96 (explaining that effective implementation requires state
implementation and effective private responses); JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 113 (explaining how
international regimes foster "accountability of states" to their own populations, other states, and the
international public), 248 (pointing out that "laws heighten public expectations"); I NSTITUTIONS FOR THE
EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 246END47 (1993) (public
support was critical to adoption and implementation of effective regulations addressing oil pollution).
315.Democratic accountability does play a role in this process. See PATERSON, supra note 85, at 61END62
(describing how the United States modified its position on climate change after George Bush endured public
criticism for his initial position).
316.See MABEY, supra note 55, at 10 (while the Montreal Protocol "enforced substantive controls" many
other multilateral agreements did not); Ardia, supra note 38, at 504 ("Few international environmental
agreements contain substantive commitments ._._._."); Compliance With International Environmental
Treaties: The Empirical Evidence, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 234 (1997) [hereinafter Compliance]; cf.
Giselle Vigneron, Compliance and International Agreements: A Case Study of the 1995 United Nations
Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 581 (1998) (describing compliance
mechanisms and concluding that we do not have sufficient data to evaluate actual compliance with this
agreement yet); Rebecca Becker, MARPOL 73/78: An Overview in International Environmental
Enforcement, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 625 (1998) (concluding that in spite of fairly specific
provisions in the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, enforcement has been
uneven).
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good or bad international legal rules.317 Perhaps more importantly, these imprecise laws tend to foster national
failures to take concrete actions to meet the regime's goals.318 The public may have difficulty holding national
government officials accountable for violating an international legal norm, if the norm does not clearly explain
what international law demands of a country.319
The Framework Convention articulates a broad normative idea that nations should avoid dangerous
climate change.320 It translates this broad norm into a developed country "aim" of returning greenhouse gas
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.321 This locution makes it difficult to give national leaders either credit
or blame for committing to stabilize emissions (or deciding not to do anything). The phrasing makes it difficult to
state whether the leaders have agreed to a binding limit stabilizing emissions or not.322 The mention of a concrete
target certainly suggests a serious commitment. But the use of the term "aim" might suggest something more akin
to a goal than a binding commitment.
Furthermore, this ambiguity made it difficult to hold nations accountable for emission increases after the
adoption of the Framework Convention. It is difficult to argue that developed countries that increased their
emissions (such as the United States) violated an international agreement. Hence, the Framework Convention had
little normative force as a generator of concrete actions.

317.See Christopher C. Joyner, Biodiversity in the Marine Environment: Resource Implications for the Law
of the Sea, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 650 (1995) (arguing that the United Nations Convention on
Biological Diversity lacks specific provisions that would "control parties whose nationals violate norms
associated with" preserving marine biodiversity).
318.See Developments, supra note 35, at 1504END07 (discussing the problem of vague obligations failing to
bind states). On the other hand, some evidence exists that ambitious, non-binding instruments may have
more influence on behavior than modest binding agreements. See Compliance, supra note 315, at 241END50.
Those who propose new models based on this seem to agree that the Climate Change Convention needs
binding commitments, but that stronger non-binding commitments should supplement these binding
commitments. See id. at 248END49.
319.See id. at 238 (explaining that vague language in the Convention on Biodiversity makes it "quite hard
to determine when a state ._._. has ._._. committed an internationally wrongful act"); Koh, Why Nations
Obey?, supra note 119 at 2640 (noting the role of non-governmental organizations in norm
"interpretation").
320.See Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 854.
321.Id. art. 4(2)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 857.
322.See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 77 (discussing interpretation of the "target"); Dr. Ranee
Khooshie Lal Panjabie, supra note 2, at 528END29 (referring to "constructive ambiguities" in these articles).
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Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol, however, seems to help clarify national obligations under the Climate
Change Convention.323 It establishes national quantified emission limitations, stated as a percentage reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels. Article 3, section 1 clearly establishes these limits as binding, stating
that the developed country parties "shall . . . ensure that their . . . emissions of . . . greenhouse gases . . . do not
exceed their assigned amounts."324 This means that while holding the international community accountable for any
particular accomplishment is difficult, the Protocol, absent trading, establishes a clear basis for holding each
developed nation accountable for meeting a quantifiable national commitment.325 The national caps in Annex B
seem to translate an amorphous international goal, preventing dangerous climate change, into fairly specific
national obligations aimed at moving toward this goal.326
However, these seemingly concrete physical national obligations vanish before the eyes of a careful reader,
because of provisions designed to facilitate trading. In fact, the treaty may instead create a much less specific
"virtual" obligation, a developed country's obligation to either make the required reduction or earn credits abroad
deemed equivalent to the specified reduction under rules yet to be defined. 327 Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol may be
read as not requiring any emission reductions at all, to the extent it allows tree planting to substitute for emission
reductions.328 The Kyoto Protocol now contains more amorphous commitments than the Protocol would have if the

323.See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 42. The Kyoto Protocol, however, did not
establish a specific aggregate emission limitation for developed counties' emissions. Instead, article 3,
section 1 of the Protocol requires these parties to return their greenhouse gas emissions to country-specific
levels set out in an annex to the agreement "with a view to reducing their overall emissions ._._. by five
percent." Id. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33. This "overall emissions" provision suffers from the same vice as the
earlier "aim" to stabilize language, ambiguity about whether a binding commitment exists. Id. Hence, no
hard cap exists for aggregate emissions from developed countries.
324.Id. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33.
325.The Protocol, however, remains vague about when these countries must achieve these reductions. It
requires that the parties must achieve this level between 2008 and 2012. See id. art. 3(7), 37 I.L.M. at 34.
This means it will be impossible to recognize a failure to meet the target until 2012.
326.I qualify the term "specific" with the word "fairly" because the limit applies to a basket of greenhouse
gases, including some that are not very well monitored. Hence, the limit is more amorphous than a limit on
a single gas would be.
327.See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, arts. 3(10-12), 4, 6, 12, 17, 37 I.L.M. at 34-35, 38, 40; cf.
Breidenich et al., supra note 100, at 327 (stating on the one hand that the Protocol establishes a clear,
mandatory set of targets, but on the other hand, allows those targets to be increased).
328.See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, arts. 3(3), (7), 6(1)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 33, 35-36.
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countries of the world had agreed to the reductions specified in Annex B without trading.
This vagueness creates real difficulties in determining what precisely the parties have agreed to do. A
post-Kyoto dispute concerning trading of so-called "hot air" illustrates this vagueness.329 Because of the economic
collapse of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, emissions have fallen in this area since 1990, in spite of
antiquated energy systems.330 A dispute has arisen about whether other developed countries may purchase credits
reflecting this downturn in emissions in lieu of physical national compliance.331
If the COP allows trading of "hot air" credits, the developed countries will likely realize less aggregate
emission reductions than national compliance without trading would generate.332 But to the extent the five percent
aggregate developed country reduction target in the Kyoto Protocol already takes the economic downturn of
countries in transition to market economies into account, the developed countries may realize this five percent
target, even if they trade "hot air."333 Accepting this use of hot air involves interpreting the treaty as using the five
percent target, rather than the results of each nation complying with its binding national cap, as the measuring rod
of effective implementation. But the Protocol creates no binding obligation to meet the five percent target. Rather,
it states that the developed countries "shall, individually or jointly ensure that their aggregate . . . emissions . . . do
not exceed their assigned amounts . . . with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5
percent."334 This language resembles the amorphous language expressing the Framework Convention's aim to

329.See CHRIS ROLFE, TURNING DOWN THE HEAT: EMISSIONS TRADING AND CANADIAN IMPLEMENTATION OF
60, 310END12 (1998); U.N. Researcher Faults EU Opposition to Emission Trading
for Kyoto Compliance, 21 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 415 (Apr. 28, 1998).

THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

330.See ROLFE, supra note 328, at 311 (Russian emissions are currently only 74% of 1990 emissions, and
they are only projected to increase to 80 or 90% of 1990 levels by 2010).
331.See Commission Outlines `Step-by-Step' Plan for Emissions Trading Under Kyoto Protocol, 21 Int'l
Env't. Rep. (BNA) 551 (June 10, 1998) (describing European opposition to hot air credits). I use the
locution "purchase credits" to encompass both purchase of emission reduction units under article 6 and
bubbling under article 4.
332.ROLFE, supra note 328, at 311 (Hot air trading "will allow nations buying the rights to increase their
emissions while the nations selling them do nothing to reduce their emissions.").
333.See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33; U.N. Researcher Faults EU Opposition to
Emission Trading for Kyoto Compliance, 21 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) 415 (Apr. 28, 1998); cf. Breidenich et
al., supra note 100, at 320 (emission reduction is equivalent to 5.2 percent only if one does not take into
account the 1995 base year used for HFCs, PFCs, SF6, and the possible use of the Clean Development
Mechanism).
334.Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33 (emphasis added).
 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 1998 / Pre-publication copy / Page 61

stabilize emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.335 If compliance with this language provides the measuring rod
for assessing implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the world has made little progress in clarifying the Framework
Convention.
One might hypothesize that the Kyoto Protocol clearly requires that developed countries at least
collectively ensure that their aggregate emissions equal the aggregate of their national targets.336 But to the extent
the COP allows developed countries to claim credits for reductions in developing countries under Article 12,
developed country emissions will likely exceed the aggregate limits as well.337 The provisions introduced to
facilitate trading make definite simple statements about what precisely the parties have agreed to accomplish very
difficult. This hinders public understanding of the agreement and accountability.
The logic of the idea of emissions trading may lead to imprecise law making. Emissions trading involves
indifference to the location of reductions.338 Government officials eager to avoid accountability may treat the
emissions trading idea as an opportunity to avoid making specific decisions about where reductions will come
from. Indeed, emissions trading may help officials avoid specificity about what must be done. They may avoid
specifying which pollutants polluters must reduce or even whether pollution must be reduced at all. To the extent
that national leaders avoid decisions, environmental law will become vague and more difficult to enforce.
Almost all environmental legal regimes involve a series of steps translating general requirements into
concrete decisions to require specific emission reductions of specific polluters.339 If trading fosters vague law, it
may seriously disrupt these environmental legal regimes.
One may design a trading program specific enough to induce a specific response. The acid rain program,
for example, contains unusually specific decisions allocating specific numbers of allowances to emit sulfur dioxide

335.See Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 4(2)(a), (b), 31 I.L.M. at 856-57.
336.See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33.
337.See id. art. 12(3)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 38; Breidenich et al., supra note 100, at 320.
338.See Driesen, supra note 2, at 332.
339.See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Should Congress Direct the Environmental Protection Agency to Allow
Serious Harms to Public Health to Continue?: Cost-Benefit Tests and National Ambient Air Quality
Standards Under the Clean Air Act, 11 TULANE ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998) (explaining that states
decide which pollution sources to address and how stringently to regulate their emissions in order to meet
national ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act).
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to specific facilities, but then authorizes trading of these allowances.340 Nevertheless, the trading idea has a
tendency to encourage vague law.

2. Trading as an Impediment to Accountability for Meeting Commitments
Trading may make it difficult to hold any given national government accountable for meeting treaty
commitments. The degree of the undermining of accountability, however, depends upon the particulars of the
trading program.
The Kyoto Protocol allows developed countries, rather than private parties, to transfer "emission
reduction" units amongst themselves.341 This comports with the Protocol's overall structure. The Protocol does not
create obligations for any particular private party. It only creates obligations for countries. Individual nations
choose how to translate these national obligations into programs aimed at particular sources of emissions. Hence,
the treaty relies upon national government officials taking responsibility for inducing appropriate private actions to
reach an aggregate national target.
The Kyoto Protocol also requires developed country parties to subtract or add transferred units to their
"assigned amount."342 Suppose that the country of "Small" emitted 100 million metric tons of emissions in 1990
and must make a five percent cut under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, a five million ton reduction. If that country
purchases a million tons of carbon credits abroad, this accounting provision would allow Small to substract the one
million tons of credits from its five million ton assigned reduction, yielding a requirement to reduce domestic
emissions by only four million tons. Conversely, if Small sold one million tons of credits, it would have to add a
million tons to its five million ton assigned reduction and make a six million ton domestic reduction.
If the COP interprets this provision to require this adjustment prior to carrying out joint implementation
activities, this would help preserve national accountability.343 Each developed country would have to meet a target

340.See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651c(e) tbl. A, 7651d(g) tbl. B (1994) (allocating allowances to particular emitting
units). See generally Van Dyke, supra note 225.
341.See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(10-12), 37 I.L.M. at 34.
342.Id.
343.The Kyoto Protocol provides for advanced transfer under article 4, when countries agree to implement
their commitments jointly. See id. art. 4(1), (2), 37 I.L.M. at 34. But articles 6 and 12 provide for transfer of
"emission reduction units" and "certified emission reductions" without explicitly requiring advanced
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adjusted to account for expected trades and could be held accountable for physically meeting the adjusted target,
whether the trades occur or not. As long as an international body does the math necessary to adjust the targets
properly, this may not greatly complicate national accountability.
Trading may, however, proceed in a way that would make national accountability very difficult. For
example, the COP could plausibly interpret the Kyoto Protocol not to require specific a priori national decisions
about the amount of credits to purchase or sell, since most of the provisions for adjusting accounts do not explicitly
state when the accounting should occur (or who should monitor it).344
Rules that adjust national accounts after the fact might make it very difficult for the public to reliably
monitor national implementation in a timely manner.345 Suppose, for example, that the country of Big writes a plan
that credibly provides for its required five percent reduction, but states that some unspecified amount of these
reductions may come from the country of Small. Small submits a plan to realize its five percent reduction, but
states that it may sell some credits to Big. If the emission reductions called for under Small's plan earn credits in
Big, non-compliance occurs because of double counting.
For example, suppose that both countries emit 100 million metric tons of carbon dioxide in 1990. Absent
trading, Big would reduce its emissions by 5 million tons to 95 million tons (a five percent cut) and Small would
reduce its emissions by 5 million tons to 95 million tons in order to comply, thus reducing their aggregate to the
190 million ton level. If Big claims credit for 5 million tons of Small's reductions made as part of Small's treaty
compliance, then Small would still emit 95 million tons at the end of the compliance period, since it would make
the reductions it planned to make. But Big would emit 100 million tons at the end of the period, because its credits
would justify not making any physical reductions. Trading would then only bring aggregate emissions down to the
195 million ton level, a level 5 million tons higher than the level a non-trading program would achieve. Double
counting would reduce program performance.

adjustment of targets. See id. arts. 6, 12, 37 I.L.M. at 35, 38. See Vellinga & Heintz, supra note 283, at 8
(proposing separate accounting for joint implementation projects and dual commitments to funding
reductions abroad and making some at home).
344.See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, arts. 3(10), (11), 6, 12, 37 I.L.M. at 34, 35, 38; see also id. art. 17
(postponing decision on "accountability" for emissions trading); cf. id. art. 4(1-2), 37 I.L.M. at 34.
345.See generally JURGIELEWICZ, supra note 8, at 113 (explaining that international regimes must make
states accountable by "rendering their performance transparent to scrutiny by the international
community").
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Nobody (including the officials writing the plans) can tell whether national plans count the same emission
reduction twice, unless the plans state which emission reductions will be traded and which will count toward
domestic compliance. Hence, absent a priori decisions about transfers or systematic rules prohibiting and checking
for double counting, one cannot use a national plan reliably to evaluate likely compliance.
Indeed, trading undermines national accountability by making it theoretically impossible for a country to
ensure its own compliance with the virtual emission reduction obligation. Absent trading, countries can, by simply
monitoring their own emissions and implementing adequate measures, make sure that they meet their emission
reduction obligations. To the extent that they use trading to meet their own obligations, they may depend on
monitoring and oversight abroad to ensure that the country from which they purchased credits actually makes the
reductions. Failures outside of the national jurisdiction can prevent national compliance. Furthermore, countries
using even well-monitored credits cannot know whether these credits are surplus to the generating country's
national compliance efforts (and therefore legitimately tradable), without evaluating another country's plans and
compliance efforts. At the end of the compliance period one could, in theory, determine whether the developed
countries achieved the cuts envisioned by the treaty in the aggregate.346 But by then, it's too late to correct failures.
Furthermore, national governments may lack sufficient incentives to respond to public demands to
monitor joint implementation properly, because they can readily escape responsibility for failures by blaming them
on private companies or the other country involved in joint implementation.347 Even if one determined precisely
what went wrong after the fact (which would require a lot of effort and coordination),348 a problem would exist
about who should accept responsibility, the credit purchasing or the credit generating country.349

346.See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 33.
347.It would take an enormous effort just to determine precisely what happened. One would have to look at
each joint implementation project and determine whether it was double counted or failed to deliver the
reductions attributed to it. This would involve review of compliance data and a careful review of the
project's place in several nation's plans.
348.See Rolf Selrod & Asborn Torvanger, What Might be the Minimum Requirements for Making the
Mechanism of Implementation Under the Climate Convention Credible and Operational, in OPPORTUNITIES
END
7 (discussing possible "leakage" problems).
AND APPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 6
349.See GUPTA, supra note 160, at 130 (asking whether the host country or the investing country will be
responsible for project failure); Joint Liability System Proposed for Buyers, Sellers in Global Trading
System, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 353 (June 12, 1998). The COP could address this problem by writing clear
legal rules about responsibility for shortfalls arising from joint implementation. These rules could also spell
out responsibilities for making sure that double counting did not occur and that credits reflect real emission
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International trading also creates a perverse incentive with respect to monitoring. Credit users can save
money by purchasing credits from jurisdictions incapable or unwilling to properly monitor credit generating
activity.350 Even if a given pollution reduction activity costs the same amount in two jurisdictions and generates
identical actual emission reductions, an incentive exists to make reductions in the jurisdiction where one can
exaggerate the number of credits and escape effective oversight.351 This undermines accountability, because nations
may plausibly claim compliance based on trades they do not monitor.352
Proponents of trading sometimes disclaim any need for government oversight by invoking free market
metaphors. People purchase blue jeans without the government monitoring every transaction and quality remains
good. A few trading proponents may imagine that the "invisible hand" of the free market might ensure proper
generation and use of environmental credits without effective government oversight.
The free market tends to produce good blue jeans because the purchasers care about the quality of the
product. The purchaser buys the product specifically to obtain the benefits good blue jeans provide. If the blue jeans
start falling apart in the first month of wearing, customers will stop purchasing jeans from that company. Because
companies want customers to continue purchasing their jeans, they tend to make good blue jeans.
Emissions trading by private parties divorces purchase from interest in the quality of the "goods," absent
government oversight. Private parties usually do not purchase emission reduction credits because they want to

reductions that would not occur otherwise.
350.See Stavins, supra note 116, at 312 (discussing the incentive for parties to a joint-implementation
project to exaggerate its value).
351.See MABEY, supra note 55, at 25; A. Markandaya, JI: The Way Forward or A Negotiator's Nightmare,
in OPPORTUNITIES AND APPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 39END40 (discussing incentive to inflate
baselines so as to exaggerate reductions). Dr. Markandaya argues that payments based on the level of
reductions could reduce the incentive to exaggerate reductions. As explained below, this argument is
incorrect to the extent it suggests that the market by itself would reduce the incentive to exaggerate
reductions. Effective oversight by international institutions, if that is possible, might reduce the incentives
to exaggerate.
352.Professor Stavins claims that allocating more permits to permit sellers in an emissions trading scheme
would somehow "address" the enforcement difficulty that emissions trading might create. See Stavins, supra
note 116, at 310. He argues that this allocation would make sellers "vulnerable to enforcement actions by
the (enforcing) coalition of countries." He does not explain why an enforcing coalition of countries would
emerge or how they could enforce reductions. Indeed, he seems to admit that the "enforcing coalition"
would likely be the developed countries who purchase credits, and that the very scheme he advocates creates
an incentive for them not to enforce. Id. The buyers would have an interest in allowing fraud so as to reduce
the costs of purchasing credits.
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realize real environmental improvement. If that were a sufficient motivation to purchase reduction credits, no need
would exist to allow the use of credits to fulfill local emission reduction obligations. Instead, companies would
simply engage in voluntary cleanup without emissions trading.
Rather, companies purchase credits because they can use them to fulfill an environmental obligation that
they would otherwise have to fulfill with more expensive domestic measures.353 The emission credit "goods," no
matter how shoddy, are adequate for the companies' purposes if the government accepts them.
Indeed, from the purchaser's point of view, the best credits are the cheapest. The cheapest credits reflect
no conscious effort to improve the environment, for they cost nothing to generate. Routine economic activity
generates incidental emission reductions and increases all the time, even with no environmental efforts going on,
public or private. Plants generate emission reductions routinely in response to market signals, by reducing
production when orders fall off, closing unprofitable facilities, and replacing outmoded equipment with newer
equipment.354 Absent very restrictive rules, polluters in an emissions trading system may purchase credits
reflecting these incidental reductions occurring elsewhere.355 They need not, however, assume debits for increases
that occur elsewhere when business picks up or a new plant opens up.
This problem of credits for doing nothing does not matter very much in a comprehensive cap and trade
system. Such a system prohibits all relevant private parties from emitting pollution without permits and limits the
quantity of permitted emissions to reflect environmental goals. But the Climate Change Convention does not
directly limit the emissions of any individual polluter, much less all of them.356 Trading under the Climate Change
Convention, absent a very strong set of rules and implementing institutional arrangements, may well allow
incidental reductions that occur as overall global emissions rise to justify taking fewer specific actions to reverse

353.Companies may also carry out joint implementation because they anticipate using the credits later. See
Joint Implementation, supra note 161, at 74.
354.See Driesen, supra note 2, at 315.
355.In the climate change context, Russia, the Ukraine, and Eastern European nations have abundant
credits available that reflect no pollution control effort, because of the collapse of their economies after
1990. See ROLFE, supra note 328, at 311 (describing claiming credit for credits generated by economic
collapse as "hot air"); U.N. Researcher Faults EU Opposition to Emission Trading for Kyoto Compliance,
21 Int'l Envt. Rep. (BNA) 415 (Apr. 28, 1998).
356.See Navroz K. Dubash, Commoditizing Carbon: Social and Environmental Implications of Joint
Implementation, in OPPORTUNITIES AND APPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 52END56 (explaining the
difference between a tradable carbon permit system and joint implementation).
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the trends.357
The issue of what constitutes effective government oversight in this context, of course, gives rise to
endless debate.358 My point here, however, is limited. Emissions trading across jurisdictional lines tends to
undermine political accountability. The precise extent of this problem depends upon the particulars of the trading
system adopted. But the general tendency exists.359 And the debate about joint implementation under the Climate
Change Convention has not adequately addressed these issues.360
This tendency has important long-term implications. The weakening of accountability may, in the longterm, undermine international environmental law. If international environmental law generates a series of
seemingly concrete, but ultimately elusive obligations, it will lose its effectiveness over time. 361 Defections from
international treaties may rise and nations seeking resolution of international environmental problems may turn to
unilateral remedies, such as trade sanctions, or in extreme cases, even war.362 Alternatively, important global
problems may simply go unaddressed, because the law fails to generate concrete solutions to them.

357.See Rolf Selrod & Asbjorn Torvanger, What Might be the Minimum Requirements for Making the
Mechanism of Implementation under the Climate Change Convention Credible and Operational, in
OPPORTUNITIES & APPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 5 (the emissions growth rate can be positive even if
countries implement some measures reducing emissions); see also Chiranjeev Bed, No-Regrets Under Joint
Implementation, in OPPORTUNITIES & APPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 103END07 (arguing that allowing
credit for "no-regrets" options, cheap or profitable reduction opportunities will lower "overall abatement").
358.See, e.g., OPPORTUNITIES & APPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 1END12, 99END103; Green & Sands,
supra note 159, at 82END85.
359.See generally Marchant, supra note 234, at 628 (the effectiveness of an emissions trading program
depends upon its legal, technical and administrative details).
360.In this respect, the evolution of the climate change convention so far is not encouraging. The Kyoto
Protocol lacks any institutional or procedural detail on how compliance with trading provisions will be
assessed. See Werksman, supra note 128, at 13END14 (identifying this defect in pre-Kyoto proposals). See
generally Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10.
361.Indeed, most environmental agreements already fail to accomplish much, in part because of weaknesses
in monitoring and enforcement provisions. See Ardia, supra note 38, at 504END05.
362.See Sean T. Fox, Responding to Climate Change: The Case for Unilateral Trade Measures to Protect
the Global Atmosphere, 84 GEO. L.J. 2499 (1996) (arguing for the use of trade sanctions to promote efforts
to address climate change); David M. Driesen, The Congressional Role in International Environmental Law
and its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 287, 303END08 (1991)
(describing some of the history and theory of unilateral action).
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3. Interference with a Principle of National Responsibility for Private Sector Emissions
International law traditionally involves law governing relationships between sovereign states.363 The idea
of sovereignty has a territorial basis. Nations have the right and responsibility to control activities within their
borders.364 These general principles of international law give rise to specific principles of national responsibility in
the international environmental area. International environmental law establishes a general national duty to make
sure that private sector activities on a nation's soil do not cause serious environmental harms to neighboring
countries, a territorial responsibility principle.365
The assignment of specific national emission reduction targets is consistent with the territorial
responsibility principle. Nations assume responsibility for reducing harmful emissions from their territory.
Trading relaxes this territorial principle. Nations may allow harmful emissions to emanate from their
territory, if they earn credits somewhere else. This may represent a fairly serious departure from a norm of national
responsibility for consequences of actions taking place within a nation's territory.366
Perhaps greater global integration invites a broader ethic of responsibility. For example, countries could
be held responsible for all of the environmentally destructive activities their nationals participate in or finance
regardless of location under a "financial responsibility principle." But allowing a country to claim credits for
reductions the country or its nationals finance abroad, without requiring it to assume responsibility for emission
increases the country or its nationals finance abroad, does not advance a "financial responsibility principle," or any
other discernible ethic of national responsibility.
363.See generally Koh, Why Nations Obey?, supra note 119, at 2603END14 (discussing the evolution of the
concept of international law). Of course, non-governmental organizations and other non-state actors have
become increasingly important in the development of international regimes. See, e.g., Chiara Giorgetti, The
Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Climate Change Negotiations, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 115 (1998).
364.See Ardia, supra note 38, at 499 ("Historically, customary international law has provided that a
sovereign state has jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its laws ._._. within its territorial borders.").
365.See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1933 (1938) (Canadians ordered to pay
damages for pollution caused by a privately owned smelter); 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1966 (1941) (establishing
pollution control regime for the same smelter); Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, June 16, 1972, princ. 21, 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (states must ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction do not damage areas beyond their jurisdiction). See generally Arthur K. Kuhn, Comment, The
Trail Smelter Arbitration-United States and Canada, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 785 (1938).
366.Cf. Green & Sands, supra note 159, at 83END84 (discussing whether emissions trading conflicts with
state sovereignty over natural resources).
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Since the Climate Change Convention does not require countries to assume debits for emission increases
or rainforest destruction that they finance, it does not advance any competing ethic.367 The Convention's embrace
of emissions trading departs from the principle of national responsibility for emissions within the national territory.
Countries' willingness to hold their nationals accountable to the international community rests in no small
measure upon their acceptance of the national responsibility principle. If international emissions trading becomes
widespread and undermines this principle, it will make it very difficult to hold nations accountable for pollution
emitted in their countries, most of which comes from private activity. Weakening the national responsibility
principle would make it very difficult to negotiate and implement international agreements effectively addressing
international environmental problems.368

C. The Broader Significance of the Cheap Fix Theory of Emissions Trading
Emissions trading in the climate change context may constitute a cheap fix, because it delays innovations,
undermines important principles at the heart of international agreements to address climate change, and
undermines democratic accountability.369 The cheap fix nature of trading under the Climate Change Convention
carries important lessons for the theory of emissions trading generally.
Emissions trading also constitutes a cheap fix if applied to other environmental problems. Emissions
trading tends to produce less innovation than systems without trading. Simply put, innovation may require large
investments and emissions trading's objective is to lower short-term investment in environmental protection,
without sacrificing short-term environmental progress. Furthermore, trading may facilitate avoidance of
inexpensive, but politically difficult, change.
Emissions trading also tends to undermine democratic accountability for environmental problems. It does

367.Cf. GUPTA, supra note 160, at 118 (citing Indonesian views that a debiting system should accompany
the crediting system).
368.See generally Yamin, supra note 180, at 5 (stating that certain uses of the trading system "would ._._.
sink the entire Climate Change Convention Process by robbing it of all credibility").
369.See generally Navroz K. Dubash, Commoditizing Carbon: Social and Environmental Implications of
Joint Implementation, in OPPORTUNITIES AND APPREHENSIONS, supra note 161, at 77END80 (arguing joint
implementation will jeopardize the long-term effectiveness of the Framework Convention).
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this systematically in all cases by complicating monitoring and enforcement.370 The severity of this problem
depends on the particulars of the trading program.371 Indeed, few difficulties arise if a single jurisdiction controls
the program, an adequately staffed agency supervises trades, and the program requires reliable emissions
monitoring. But trading programs that cross jurisdictional lines, involve transactions that are difficult to monitor,
or are not supported by adequate agency tracking resources, pose a real threat to accountability.372 Trading always
poses more difficulties for monitoring and enforcement than a comparable non-trading program.373
Emissions trading may undermine the developed country leadership principle in the Climate Change
Convention and hence the future development of this treaty. This point about the particulars of the Climate Change
Convention leads to several more general conclusions.
First, trading must comply with the laws under which it operates. Otherwise, it will tend to undermine the
law. The potential of trading to conflict with the legal principle of developed country leadership in the Climate
Change Convention provides an example of this problem. Violation of the provisions providing for leadership
would weaken the entire regime.
Second, whenever the geography of emission reductions raises equity concerns, trading without
constraints that adequately address those concerns may create injustice. These injustices can destabilize the law,
undermine support for sound economic incentive programs, and interfere with environmental progress. Most
trading proponents recognize the need to avoid trading that creates "hotspots," concentrations of pollutants with
locally significant effects. For example, one cannot ethically justify allowing local pollution to cause cancer in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, by claiming a credit for a reduction in New Jersey.
The climate change example shows that the geographic principle involved is much broader than the
principle that trading should not create hotspots. When the geography matters to the equities of shifting reductions,
trading without adequate geographic constraints may undermine the sense of shared responsibility and community

370.For a more detailed explanation of this point, see Driesen, supra note 2, at 310 n.100.
371.Id. at 311, 319END22.
372.See Green & Sands, supra note 159, at 82END85 (describing some of the difficulties that confront
international emissions trading in the climate change context).
373.See Driesen, supra note 2, at 310 n.100.
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needed to make environmental protection effective in the long-run.374 Equity may properly restrain the location of
reductions either because of the localized effects of the pollution reductions or because equity makes geographically
specific assignments of responsibility important.
The points about innovation and accountability show that emissions trading is always a cheap fix. The
points about equity and geography should constrain trading generally and may give rise to overlooked long-term
problems in some contexts.

III. HOW TO THINK ABOUT CHEAP FIXES
Even if a homeowner recognizes that patching the roof constitutes a cheap fix, she does not automatically
replace the roof every time it leaks. She may quite rationally decide that the cheap fix makes more sense than
replacing the roof in some circumstances.
Similarly, recognizing that trading is a cheap fix rather than a free lunch does not establish that policy
makers should abandon all emissions trading. Rather, the cheap fix theory re-frames the analysis of proposals to
employ emissions trading. It introduces questions about innovation, democratic accountability, equity, and the
relationship of technical fixes to long-term values.
The particular cheap fix problem examined in this article, emissions trading, is an example of a pervasive,
but understudied, legal and policy problem. Cheap fix problems arise all the time in many different contexts, and a
full theory of how to think about cheap fixes would require another article. But this part will seek to contribute
something to this task.
This part will first explain why legal scholarship that successfully identifies cheap fix problems may make
a substantial contribution to policy discussions. Second, this part will outline a barebones theory of how to think
about the choice between cheap fixes and more enduring solutions with more short-term costs. Third, this part will
apply these principles to the problem of joint implementation under the Climate Change Convention. It explains
how one might use trading to lower short-term costs without unduly damaging the long-term future of the effort to
address global climate change and develop effective international environmental law. Abandoning the free lunch
theory of emissions trading leads to a more thorough and thoughtful consideration of particular proposed
374.See Yamin, supra note 180, at 4END5 (discussing the equity concerns of developing countries aroused by
the allocation of emission reduction burdens in the context of joint implementation at Kyoto).
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applications of trading, rather than to either the automatic rejection or acceptance of proposed trading programs.

A. Identifying Cheap Fix Problems as a Central Task for Legal Scholarship Addressing Legislative Problems
Cheap fix problems arise all of the time. But policy makers and scholars may fail to recognize cheap fix
problems or to address them adequately.
For example, the framers of the United States Constitution adopted a cheap fix to the problem of how to
address slavery. They agreed to perpetuate slavery and treat slaves as less than full citizens.375 Specifically, Article
I, section 9 of the Constitution prohibited the abolition of the international slave trade until 1809.376 Article IV,
section 2 prohibited states from emancipating fugitive slaves.377 And Article I, section 2 of the constitution treated
each slave as three-fifths of a person for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives and the
apportionment of federal taxes.378 This compromise helped facilitate the agreement of southern states to enter the
union.379
We have paid, and continue to pay, a very heavy price for this cheap fix.380 The failure to implement an
adequate solution to slavery led to a civil war and contributed to enormous problems that still plague us.381

375.See WILLIAM WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA: 1760END1848
62 (1977).
376.U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
377.Id. art. IV, § 2.
378.Id. art. I, § 2 states:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included
within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. (emphasis added)
The provision uses the locution "other Persons" to refer to slaves. The provision requires adding
the "whole Number of free Persons" to three fifths of "other Persons," meaning the Persons not free.
Constitutional scholars agree that the Framers intended this. See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 376 at 65END70.
Professor Wiecek identifies several other provisions that addressed slavery as well. See id. at 62END63.
379.See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 30 (1987);
WIECEK, supra note 376, at 68END72.
380.See BELL, supra note 378, at 26, 28END29, 32, 37.
381.See id.; see also WIECEK, supra note 374, at 15.
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Some leaders at the time understood that slavery was unjust.382 But identification of an injustice does not
amount to identification of a "cheap fix." Rather, writing that identified the perhaps less apparent long-term
problems that slavery would create would show that its perpetuation was a cheap fix.
Tax scholars for a number of years have complained about the use of the tax code to enact politically
cheap fixes to societal problems.383 Lawmakers often like to further favored values by granting tax credits or
deductions for behavior deemed desirable.384
Tax scholars pointed out that the use of exemptions, deductions, and credits for a wide variety of social purposes
tends to complicate the tax code over time.385 This may undermine voluntary compliance and augment general
distrust of government in the long-term, even if each exemption enacted serves valid societal goals.386
Professor Michael Graetz has recently argued that this balkanization of the tax code has helped undermine
the very idea of a progressive and broadly applicable income tax as the principle means of funding government.387
Whether or not any of the particular cheap fixes are desirable, tax scholars have performed an important service in
identifying the long-term problem of cheap fixes tending to complicate and undermine the tax code.
Identification of cheap fix problems should be a central task of scholars studying legislation and
treaties.388 Scholars' ability to reflect upon the broader purposes of a law and its history and direction enable them

382.See BELL, supra note 378, at 28, 35 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Abigail Adams, and Luther Martin).
383.See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 258END59 (1997)
(pointing out that eliminating various deductions, credits, and exemptions to simplify taxes might be
unlikely because these breaks were enacted "to achieve important economic or social purposes"). Professor
Graetz, however, criticizes other tax breaks as aimed at scoring political points or satisfying special
interests. See id. at 192, 270 (discussing a recent $500-per-child income tax credit), 290 (discussing special
interest tax breaks).
384.See id. at 258END59 (discussing various examples and stating that "hardly a day passes without some
politician suggesting a new tax cut for people and companies that behave in certain ways").
385.See id.
386.See id. at 269END70 (discussing how short term politics trump long-term goals for the tax code, like that
of simplicity).
387.See GRAETZ, supra note 382, at 3, 7END8 (identifying the "foolish and unnecessary complexities" of the
tax code as one of four factors undermining the income tax).
388.In recent years the value and importance of studying the substance of legislation has received increased
recognition. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545 (1997) (discussing the role of cost-benefit
analysis in pollution control law); STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
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to identify long-term values (and threats to them) that others, including legislators, may overlook. 389 Since ample
incentives exist to pay attention to short-term problems even without legal scholarship, this may represent a
substantial contribution. Moreover, legislators often may legislate without sufficient foresight, because of the
immense pressures to attend to the considerations of the moment. Cheap fix scholarship may help clarify what
precisely a body of law should do in the long run.
Identification of cheap fixes may seem similar to the identification of "hidden costs" as a first step in
finding "efficient" solutions to societal problems. When economists identify important disadvantages to any
solution, they create an illusion of certainty by characterizing the disadvantage as a cost (sometimes hidden). This
word, "cost," suggests that the disadvantage identified, a) is amenable to quantification, and b) can be "weighed"
against other "costs" and "benefits" without any reasoned explanation of the weighing. It also draws attention away
from the shape and dimension of the particular disadvantage under consideration.390
Legal scholars can identify cheap fixes and important long-term problems whether or not they wish to
pursue efficiency as a goal. Indeed, they may perform a valuable service by spelling out institutional and societal
ramifications of cheap fixes, rather than simply stating that they are a cost and sending them out to a weighing
station in the sky.391

EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) (critiquing regulation); Edward Rubin, The Concept of Law and the
New Public Law Scholarship, 89 MICH. L. REV. 792, 792 (1991) (noting that the judiciary is an
"increasingly secondary legal institution" and discussing some of the differences between judicial and
legislative decisionmaking); Cass Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 41 DUKE L.J. 572, 607END09 (1991)
(calling for "substantive" administrative law, including critiques of legislation and administrative rules);
Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990) (advocating a
focus upon legislative legal discourse because it is potentially more progressive); Howard Latin, Ideal
Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory
Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1291END92 (1985) (critizing regulatory critics who fail to dinstinguish
claims that various reforms will meet existing statutory goals better from claims that the statutory goals are
inappropriate); cf. Ernst Freund, A Course in Statutes, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 503 (1919) (calling for courses
in legislation that rely upon materials other than just cases in 1919).
389.See generally Rubin, supra note 387, at 818 (arguing that "New Public Law" scholarship can anticipate
issues).
390.See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996) 98 (understanding a
number of different things as "costs" may obscure important qualitative distinctions).
391.See Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being Wild (forthcoming 1998)
(arguing that the Department of Interior has overlooked the long-term benefits of using a politically difficult
approach that educates the public about the value of wild animals). See generally Lawrence Lessig, Social
Meanings and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996) (discussing the advantages of considering the
meaning of legal rules).
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B. Thinking About Cheap Fixes
While identifying cheap fixes may prove helpful, legal scholars may want to contribute to the process of
choosing between cheap fixes and more enduring solutions to societal problems. This subsection addresses some
elements of this weighing.
The thoughtful homeowner considers whether patching a leaky roof may cost more in the long run than
replacing it. This involves guessing about the future of the roof. Surely, the homeowner should consider the cost of
patching or replacing the roof. But this is not the central difficulty. The central difficulty involves predicting
whether the roof, if patched, will spring a leak elsewhere anytime soon.
Policy makers must also compare the costs of cheap fixes and more enduring solutions, if the problem is
mostly about money. These decisions may depend upon expert advice about the future consequences of decisions,
comparable to the advice a roofer would give about whether a roof of a given age and condition is likely to leak
again soon. Legal scholars may have something worthwhile to say about the future economic consequences of
decisions, at least when an analysis of legal rules plays an important role in predicting future economic
consequences.
A stable long-term homeowner with adequate income will probably choose the best long-term solution to a
problem. But, the incentives for public officials operate differently. Public officials have incentives to choose
solutions that maximize perceived public benefits during their term in office.392 They may not be around when the
public experiences the consequences of cheap fixes. Hence, they may have some incentive to act more like a shortterm tenant than a long-term homeowner, spending only what is necessary to get by in the short term.
However, the analogy between homeowners and policy makers fails to capture an important dimension of
the cheap fix problem. Policy decisions for a society frequently have implications that cost-benefit analysis tends to
obscure rather than illuminate.
Law does not function solely as a means of ordering the allocation of resources and the distribution of
wealth. Rather, law may help shape norms that may influence the behaviors of members of a society. 393 These

392.See Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Processes and Products, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 471 (1996) (public
choice theory supposes that politicians' principal motivation is to secure reelection).
393.See SUNSTEIN, supra note 389, at 108END10 (rules help coordinate behavior, establish new social
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norms may contribute to building a sense of community and shared purpose.394 This sense of shared community
and purpose may play an important role in enabling a community to remain cohesive enough to address long-term
problems that resist easy solutions.395 Or, the erosion of norms reflecting the values and aspirations uniting people
may contribute to alienation and destruction of community.396 Scholars may analyze proposed laws with these
considerations in mind.
Hence, the justice inherent in policy choices may matter to law in subtle and complex ways. An analysis
comparing cheap fixes to more enduring solutions may need to clarify and discuss the likelihood that specific
decisions will further important societal values and the likelihood that they will build (or destroy) a sense of
community. This analysis may help clarify the nature of the choice between cheap fixes and more enduring
solutions.
Legal scholars may have a great deal to contribute to this process of evaluating the values at stake in
competing policy choices. Academic lawyers may explain the link between proposed legal rules and broader
societal purposes with some precision.397 Academic lawyers have training in thinking about the purposes and
meaning of legal rules.398
Scholars must understand that decision makers often have seemingly compelling reasons to prefer cheap
fixes. They always face enormous pressure to find solutions that satisfy enough powerful political interests to
actually win enactment.399
Because legislators always face powerful pressures to adopt cheap fixes, legal scholars may feel that
writing about cheap fixes may serve the interests of truth, but have very little influence upon real decision-making.
practices, and create consistent action dedicated to a long-term end); Rose, supra note 7, at 34END37
(discussing the normative message various environmental management systems convey).
394.See SUNSTEIN, supra note 389, at 109 (discussing the "expressive function" of rules).
395.See KRATOCHWIL, supra note 7, at 70 (explaining that norms enable parties with conflicting goals to
sustain a discourse and negotiate solutions).
396.Cf. id. at 90END91 (explaining how norms tend to discourage profitable defections from efforts to meet
collective goals).
397.See Rubin, supra note 387, at 826.
398.See id. (discussing lawyers' understanding of relations between normative choices and legal rules).
399.See Frickey, supra note 391, at 471END72.
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This may be true. Even when this is true in the short run, writing about cheap fix problems may call attention to
important long-term values and shift debates over time in important ways.400 This may help create the impetus for
better decisions about when to adopt cheap fixes and when to pursue more enduring solutions. Indeed, recognition
of the dilemma may sometimes lead to solutions that serve existing needs adequately, while avoiding unnecessary
damage to long-term interests that have received insufficient consideration in policy-making debates.

C. Trading Under the Climate Change Convention: A Proposal
The Clinton Administration's position on climate change may well illustrate this tendency to choose cheap
fixes in order to increase the likelihood of enactment. The administration would like the Senate to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol and may need legislative cooperation to adopt implementing legislation.401 Since many legislators favor
"free market mechanisms," use of emissions trading may constitute a "selling point" in Congress for treaty
ratification.
Emissions trading, for example, may help "sell" the Kyoto Protocol to Congress regardless of the details of
the particular trading program used. Politicians' responses to economic incentive programs may have little to do
with the actual merits of particular programs and much more to do with particular politicians' ideologies. 402 This
means that emissions trading may function as a selling point whether the particular program is wholly fraudulent,
a sound cheap fix with very bad long-term consequences, or a cheap fix designed to minimize interference with
long-term values.
This subsection shows how to design an emissions trading program that seizes many of the benefits of a

400.See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 471EMD72 (1995) (the fact that a new approach to law may
take a generation or more to alter professional thinking does not make it useless).
401.The executive branch has some authority to address climate change on its own pursuant to existing
legislation. See Woodward, supra note 15, at 223END30 (explaining that the executive branch may have
authority to address climate change pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air
Act). But some proposals to address climate change would require fresh legislation. See id. at 233END38
(discussing legislation proposed in the late 1980s and advocating passage of legislation aimed specifically at
global warming).
402.See Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment: Positive and
Normative Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading 10 (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author); cf. Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (offering a complex economic model to explain legislative preferences for
various regulatory instruments).
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cheap fix, without great harm to long-term values. This proposal seeks to reconcile the Framework Convention's
cost-effectiveness and leadership principles and to minimize emissions trading's threat to democratic
accountability. Even those that favor other proposals should recognize that the cheap fix theory helps identify
important questions that any proposal should address.

1. Focus Upon Innovation
One could require that joint implementation projects that generate credits toward compliance with
quantitative limitations involve advanced technology.403 This would effectively blend the leadership and costeffectiveness principles, creating cost-effective leadership.404
This idea comports well with the precise language creating the cost-effectiveness principle in the
Framework Convention. Article 3, section 3 adopts a principle of "taking into account that policies . . . should be

403.See H. Merkus, The Framework Convention of Climate Change: Some Thoughts on Joint
Implementation, The Hague, Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment, CCD/Paper
(1992). Professor Tsjalle van der Burg argues for acceptance of a joint implementation project and a
replaced project whose "static advantages ._._., taken together, outweigh their negative dynamic effect on
technology development or on transfer and diffusion of technologies." JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note
161, at 102.
Professor van der Burg argues that this weighing should be based on the greenhouse gas "effect" of
the loss of innovation and technological diffusion. Id. at 103. He recognizes that estimating the value of the
lost technological innovation poses enormous difficulties, but nevertheless recommends that GHG
certificates for individual projects that substitute less innovative for more innovative reduction techniques be
subject to a numerical discount. This proposal is quite impractical absent a demonstration that one can
reasonably estimate the amount of greenhouse gas emissions the advanced technology will yield in future
applications with little administrative cost. Indeed, this would not sufficeENDone would have to be able to
calculate the joint implementation's contribution to this future benefit stream numerically.
The problem, however, goes beyond the impracticality of such a proposal. Any joint
implementation project that substitutes a standard technology for an advanced technology is worse than no
joint implementation project at all in terms of its effect on greenhouse gases. Properly conducted joint
implementation will yield the same number of net reductions as single country implementation without a
joint implementation project. Hence, any net technological disadvantage will justify forbidding such projects
environmentally. There is no need for precise weighing.
The case for allowing joint implementation tending to discourage innovation must rely upon the
cost effectiveness principle in the treaty. There is no good case for it environmentally. The cost effectiveness
value is discussed above.

404.See Irving M. Mintzer, Institutional Options and Operational Challenges in the Management of a Joint
Implementation Regime in CRITERIA, supra note 18, at 47 (since Article 3 of the Framework Convention
urges governments to take cost effectiveness "into account," cost effectiveness cannot be the sole criterion
for project selection).
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cost effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost."405 A policy which tends to avoid
innovation through emissions trading does not ensure global benefits. Global benefits may require innovation in
order to make it possible for developing countries to assume significant binding reduction commitments. Moreover,
the next sentence in section 3 states that climate change policies should "take into account different socio-economic
contexts."406 A focus on advanced technology appropriately reflects the capabilities of developed countries and the
fact that developing countries may need advanced technology to meet climate change goals without lowering living
standards. The drafters of the Framework Convention considered these differences in capabilities and needs
important elements of the "different socio-economic contexts" that the treaty refers to.407 More obviously, the focus
on advanced technology helps implement the leadership principle. It creates a global partnership to advance the
state of the art.408
A program confined to advanced technology will not meet short-term goals as cheaply as an approach that
allows joint implementation projects based on standard technology. But it may lower the long-term costs of
avoiding dangerous levels of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.
This focus on advanced technology probably will not prevent development of a viable market. Most of the
activities implemented jointly and reported to the Secretariat of the Framework Convention on Climate Change as
part of the pilot phase involved either renewable energy or energy efficiency enhancing projects.409 On the other
hand, the Framework Convention would not allow forestry related projects, which form a substantial part of the

405.Framework Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(2), 31 I.L.M. at 854 (emphasis added). The New Delhi
Statement of the Global Environmental Facility echoes this emphasis, calling on the GEF to "stimulate"
technology transfer and adoption. New Delhi Statement of the First GEF Assembly, April 3, 1998, 21 Int'l
Envt. Rep. (BNA) 396 (Apr. 15, 1998). It states that the GEF "should increase efforts towards ensuring the
sustainability of the global environment benefits generated by GEF-financing . . . ." Id. Furthermore, the
statement provides that "GEF activities should be based on national priorities designed to support
sustainable development and the global environment." Id. Arguably, retrofits or construction of coal-fired
power plants do not fit this criteria, while more innovative energy projects may meet this criteria.
406.Id.
407.See Bodansky, supra note 2, at 499, 502END03.
408.See Mintzer, supra note 403, at 44 (Joint implementation regime will be judged by its ability to
promote transfer of environmentally sound technology "in preference to recycling the same polluting
conventional technologies that have contributed to the current state of global risk.").
409.See Pilot Phase Report, supra note 169, at 7.
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United States pilot projects, to become creditable.410
This elimination of forestry projects from joint implementation greatly lessens the potential for trading
concrete benefits for ephemeral ones. Forestry credits raise the specter of protecting one piece of land for credit,
only to see timber demand devour another piece of land more rapidly with no net climate benefit. It creates an
incentive for countries to allow deforestation, in order to make room for fresh tree planting activities for credit.
Finally, no international agreement exists about how precisely to measure carbon sequestration benefits from
forestry projects. Of course, this does not mean that forestry protection is a bad idea, it just means that the
uncertainties involved make it a poor commodity for trading.

2. Geography
This first international experiment with trading should focus upon trading emission reductions among
developed countries. This avoids undercutting the fiscal leadership principle, which requires funding reductions in
developing countries in addition to, not as a substitute for, reductions in developed countries.
Furthermore, since developing countries do not have emission caps, trade with them poses especially
difficult accounting issues.411 The United States, a single jurisdiction with a fairly sophisticated bureaucracy, has
never succeeded in making a program without an emissions cap work properly.412 It seems unlikely that fragile
international institutions, or a combination of uncoordinated national agencies of widely varying capacity, could
make such a system work properly.
In particular, trading outside a cap may well encourage countries to claim credits for incidental emission
reductions, reductions that would occur even in the absence of efforts to comply with the Climate Change

410.See Joint Implementation, (visited June 28, 1998)
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/97climate_report/part4d.html#joint> in Climate Action Report:
1997 Submission of the United States of America Under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dep't of State Pub. no. 10496 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 State Department Report] (showing
that a large number of forestry projects are part of the pilot effort).
411.See Stavins, supra note 116, at 311 (When joint implementation occurs between developed and
developing countries without developing country binding targets "it will be difficult to determine the
emission-reduction effects of a specific joint implementation project.").
412.See Driesen, supra note 2, at 311END21.
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Convention.413 If this occurs, it will lower the performance of the treaty as a whole.
The Kyoto Protocol seeks to address this problem of incidental reduction claims by requiring that credit
generating projects provide "a reduction in emissions by sources, or an enhancement of removals by sinks, that is
additional to any that would otherwise occur."414 This language does not adequately address the problem. The
requirement that developed countries only receive credit for reductions "additional" to those that "would otherwise
occur," even interpreted broadly, does not adequately address problems of demand shifts when trades occur outside
a cap. Even if a given emission reduction would not occur without a given project, the project may trigger a
demand shift that will be difficult to account for. For example, suppose that a U.S. utility pays a Brazilian power
plant to shut down, thus generating an "additional" emission reduction. This shutdown might not have occurred
without the payment, but it may still trigger an emission increase at a nearby power plant. If the U.S. power plant
claims a credit for the decrease, the United States will produce fewer emission reductions, even though Brazilian
net emissions have not changed at all.
A narrow construction of the "additionality" requirement may allow credits for things that would have
happened without any pollution control demands. For example, suppose that a company sells burners to coal-fired
power plants and receives both payment and emission credits from developing countries that have older plants with
less modern burners. It may be that this project would occur with or without pollution reduction credits. The
equipment sale may produce enough profit to justify the project even without a credit. Such a sale might meet the
"additionality" requirement, since the project might produce an emission reduction additional to what would occur
without the project. This problem could, in principle if not in practice, be solved by requiring that no credit be
granted for projects that generate revenues for the purchaser of credits. But prominent commentators, whose views
I discuss in the margin, have argued against strict implementation of an "additionality" requirement. 415 The

413.See Stavins, supra note 116, at 311END12 (low-cost abatement projects may be carried out without joint
implementation).
414.Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 6(1)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 35.
415.Professors Arts, Peters, Schrijver, and van Sluijs have opposed use of additionality constraints to bar the
use of credits from profitable projects. Indeed, they claim that "profitability" constitutes "a necessary
condition" for private participation in joint implementation. JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 44.
This statement is incorrect. Polluters with emissions control obligations face expenses and have an incentive
to invest in projects that cost less than meeting their obligations domestically, even if the projects produce
no profits. See id. at 47. Countries may also create an incentive by subsidizing projects abroad. In either
case, profitability is not necessary to encourage joint implementation. See id.
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"additionality" requirement probably will deter taking advantage of some naturally occurring decreases that have
no relationship to foreign expenditures. It may simplify national accounting for emission reductions in conjunction
with caps. But this constraint does not suffice to obviate the need for a cap as a prerequisite for trading.

3. Accountability

Insofar as private companies carry out projects because doing so is profitable, no credit is needed to
entice participation and strict criteria for granting credit will have no effect on private capital investment.
Cf. id. (claiming that strict criteria for credit will reduce capital investment in joint implementation).
In practice, it may be very difficult to properly implement the "additionality" requirement. Accord
JOINT IMPLEMENTATION supra note 161, at 52 ("[S]trict proof of additionality will often be exceedingly
difficult."), 80. In principle, it requires one to establish a baseline quantifying "what would ._._. occur"
absent an emission reducing project. Indeed, this hypothetical baseline may not suffice to stop emission END
increasing projects from generating credits. Suppose, for example, that India wishes to build a new power
plant to facilitate economic growth. Foreign investors may help build the facility. A supplier may well claim
a credit for supplying equipment by claiming that but for its contribution, the plant would be built with less
efficient equipment. Hence, projects which increase emissions generate credits justifying avoidance of
reductions, and potentially of innovation, in developed countries.
Nevertheless, Professors Arts, Peters, Schrijver, and van Sluijs argue against strict implementation
of an additionality requirement, because the "first priority must be to reduce (or absorb) [greenhouse gas
emissions] GHG." Id. This argument confuses a foregone opportunity to earn credit with a foregone
emission reduction. If a credit for joint implementation is denied, then the country that sought to purchase
the credit must make the reduction domestically. No loss of emission reductions occurs. On the other hand,
granting a credit for a reduction that would occur anyway does involve a loss of emission reductions. See id.
at 79 (recognizing that use of credits for a project that "would have been done even in the absence of joint
implementation could increase total emissions").
Professor Tsjalle van der Burg argues that the "probability" that a project might not be additional
can be safely ignored. Id. at 84END89. This argument actually amounts, at bottom, to assuming the problem
away. He assumes that the greenhouse gas "effect of the project" (or the "additionality of the project") has
no correlation with the total future "greenhouse gas concentration" (presumably meaning atmospheric
concentrations). Id. at 88. In other words, any given set of emission reductions has no correlation with
future greenhouse gas concentrations. The entire premise of the treaty (and a sound one, if the history of
environmental progress is any guide) is that a series of actions that really reduce emissions will generally
lower atmospheric concentrations of target gases. See Controls Would Cut Methane in Atmosphere,
Scientists Say, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 354 (June 12, 1998).
Having assumed away the problem, he then states that the "uncertainties related to many other
individual phenomena" (such as car purchases and other decisions that can affect emissions) counterbalance
"the uncertainty about" the greenhouse gas "effect of the project." JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161,
at 88. This amounts to an argument that since a large number of decisions effect total concentrations,
government officials do not need to ensure that society actually realizes any given legally required emission
reduction. This argument justifies general sloppiness. Since any successful program will consist of a large
number of small (but cumulatively significant) activities reducing emissions, sloppiness with respect to
individual projects on such general grounds would seriously risk failure of the program as a whole.
Finally, Professor Tsjalle van der Burg argues that strict additionality requirements might rule out
very cost effective projects. See id. at 90END91. This does not seem like a strong argument. Very cost
effective projects may attract financing without the benefit of joint implementation. See Stavins, supra note
116 at 311END12 (low cost projects may be carried out without any policy intervention). So, it seems like a
bad idea to give up emission reductions to finance them, unless they surely constitute reductions that would
not occur without joint implementation.
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One could limit the amount of trading that can occur in order to address accountability issues.416 This
would make it easier to track trading.
The joint implementation pilot projects have failed to demonstrate the feasibility of international
emissions trading. International bodies have not yet verified that the pilot projects undertaken so far have
generated the claimed reductions.417 Nor has the United States, a leading proponent of trading, verified that its
pilot joint implementation projects have produced the projected environmental benefits.418 Because the pilot phase
began fairly recently, it has not yet shown that using credits from joint projects in lieu of domestic implementation
will advance treaty goals.419 This fact, together with emissions trading's mixed record in general, should caution
against a wide expansion of trading before demonstration of institutional capacity to monitor and account for
trades. Clear decisions about who will account for and monitor these trades must precede actual trading. At least,
ensuring that the volume of trading is low enough so as not to overwhelm the understaffed bodies that must
monitor and account for trading seems a wise precaution, in light of the lack of precedent for an effective
international trading system.420
Precedent exists for numerical limits to trading volume. EPA has written a rule allowing chemical plants,
which often contain hundreds of pollution sources, to trade emission reductions among these sources.421 EPA

416.See generally JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 52 (recommending a limit on transactions as
a means of addressing fear that trading will cause countries to use "only existing technology"); U.S.
Opposes Cap on Amount of Trading Allowed to Meet Domestic Emission Goals, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 253
(May 29, 1998); EU Proposal on Emission Trading System Would Cap Amount Nations Can Buy, Sell, 29
Env't Rep. (BNA) 352 (June 12, 1998).
417.See Pilot Phase Report, supra note 169, at 5 (discussing the inadequacy of national data).
418.See 1997 State Department Report, supra note 409, at 1 (claiming that project emissions "will be," not
have been, verified). The United States government has reviewed estimates of baselines and projected future
benefits. Moreover, some private evaluations of actual (as opposed to projected) accomplishments exist.
419.See, e.g., Report on the In-depth Review of the National Communication of the United States of
America, FCCC/IDR, at 17, U.N. Doc. FCCC/IDR.1/USA (1996) (most U.S. joint implementation projects
will not reduce greenhouse gas emissions until 1997 or 1998 and will not have their full impact before
2000).
420.See Marchant, supra note 234, at 641 (private trades between sources in different countries pose
"insurmountable difficulties" because of the lack of adequate international institutions or machinery to
monitor or enforce trades); CAMERON ET AL., supra note 312, at 231END32 (pointing out that "full-fledged"
joint implementation has never been used).
421.See 40 C.F.R. pt. 63.150 (1997). This regulation only authorizes trades within a plant, so this
constitutes a geographically narrow form of emissions trading, sometimes called a bubble.
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recognized that numerous transactions might overwhelm government agencies with limited resources to verify
emission estimates.422 It limited the number of pollution sources that could trade in order to address this
problem.423
Even limited trading does allow the few pollution sources with exceptionally expensive control options to
avoid controls.424 Hence, limited trading will serve a substantial purpose.
A stringent numerical limit on trading also makes sense of the conflicting language governing the
question of whether credits from trades may count toward meeting quantitative limits set in the Kyoto Protocol.
Article 17 states that developed countries "may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their"
Article 3 commitments, but that this "trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes of meeting
quantified emissions limitation and reduction commitments under that Article."425 These provisions can be
reconciled by assuming that trading is "supplemental to domestic actions" to the extent that the country using
credits from abroad relies principally upon domestic measures to meet treaty commitments.426 The negotiating
history of the Kyoto Protocol supports such a reading.427 This implies a strict quantitative limit on the amount of
credits one can use to meet the Kyoto Protocol's quantitative targets.

It may be wise to confine this first

experiment with international trading to emissions that can be reliably quantified, such as carbon dioxide. 428 This

422.See National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories; Organic
Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Industry and Other
Processes Subject to the Negotiated Rule for Equipment Leaks, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,402, 19,428END29 (Apr. 22,
1994).
423.See id. at 19,521 (codified at 40 C.F.R. 63.150(f)(1)(1997)).
424.See, e.g., id. at 19,429 (explaining that most sources will not find a large number of opportunities for
cost-effective credits).
425.Kyoto Protocol, supra note 10, art. 17.
426.The interpretation of this provision is an open question that the COP hopes to resolve in Buenos Aires
in November of 1998. See Key Issues Outlined for Upcoming Talks on International Emission Trading
System, 21 Int'l Envt. Rep. (BNA) 414 (Apr. 29, 1998).
427.See Negotiators Optimistic on Treaty Including Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation, Nat'l Env't
Daily (BNA), Dec. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAEVR file ("[T]he European Union does
not want trading to substitute for domestic action to reduce greenhouse emissions."); Emission Trading,
Joint Implementation Specified in Draft Text for Revised Treaty, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1206 (Oct. 17, 1997)
(draft contemplates that domestic measures "should provide the main means of meeting commitments").
428.See Marchant, supra note 234, at 646END47 (discussing the means of estimating carbon dioxide
emissions).
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will increase the likelihood of success.429
Furthermore, the COP should establish clear rules assigning responsibility to verify joint implementation
credits, integrating joint implementation into national planning, assigning specific responsibilities to avoid double
counting in advance, and providing for national responsibilities and consequences for possible failures. These rules
should carefully provide for meaningful public participation in the process, so that the public can help prevent
fraud and abuse.
In order to facilitate that participation, the COP should require that all traders and their governments
provide a comprehensive set of information to an international clearinghouse. 430 This should be designed to help
the public monitor and verify any trade occurring anywhere in the world, without having to depend upon dozens of
national governments and private companies for essential information.

4. The Cheap Fix Theory and the Specific Proposal
These proposals will not appear attractive to those who think of trading as a "free lunch." The "free lunch"
theory tends to favor an objective of maximizing the volume rather than the quality of trades. Maximizing the
volume of trades will increase the cost savings from trading. Indeed, it will do this best if emission reductions are
absolutely fraudulent. The cheapest credits will come from double counting, claiming credit for activities that
would occur with or without trading, or claiming credits for activities that do not, in fact, reduce emissions.
The cheap fix theory calls attention to the full dimensions of the problem. First, to the extent trading
generates less environmental benefit than compliance without trading, it offers not just a cheap fix, but a poor
cheap fix, like a bad patch job on a homeowner's roof. Second, if trading undermines confidence in international
agreements, slows innovation, interferes substantially with the process of translating general international goals
into specific national commitments, and greatly lessens public involvement and accountability, it will undermine
progress in confronting environmental issues over time.

429.Accord id. at 650END52 (explaining that other gases are more difficult to monitor), 659END60
(discussing the problems in estimating the impacts of forestry projects); cf. William R. Moomaw, Achieving
Joint Benefits from Joint Implementation in CRITERIA, supra note 188, at 12 (noting uncertainty about exact
amount of greenhouse gas offset in a newly planted forest or energy conservation program).
430.I am indebeted to Professor William Buzbee of the Emory Law School for this idea.
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A decision to maximize the volume of trades in this first international trading experiment may, in the
long run, reduce the use of trading on the international level. 431 To the extent trading becomes a means of avoiding
innovation and accountability, it may earn a very poor reputation. To the extent it helps reduce the cost of
innovation and provides a reasonably reliable and flexible means of meeting environmental goals, its reputation
(which is deservedly mixed) will improve. It may always be a cheap fix, but depending on the ground rules, it can
be either a useful cheap fix that involves only mild conflict with long-term goals, or a very bad decision that makes
long-term progress very difficult. The cheap fix theory helps make this dilemma apparent.

CONCLUSION
Cheap fix issues deserve more scholarly attention. Emissions trading, long thought of as a "free lunch," is
really a cheap fix. Policy makers should take this into account as they address proposals for emissions trading.

431.See AXEL MICHAELOWA, JOINT IMPLEMENTATION OF GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS UNDER
CONSIDERATION OF FISCAL AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES 21 (1995) (Some saving potential must be
sacrificed in order to prevent misuse of joint implementation "and so ensure its long-term operability.").
Some observers cite the Montreal Protocol as precedent for joint implementation under the Climate Change
Treaty. See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 11. The Montreal Protocol does contain some
language that resembles the joint implementation language found in the climate change treaty. See id. at 10
(citing Montreal Protocol, supra note 37, art. 2(8)(a)). But this provision only applied to trades within the
European Union. See BENEDICK, supra note 44, at 94END97 (describing the political background).
Furthermore, the Montreal Protocol allowed transfer of production allowances between countries. See JOINT
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 161, at 10. It does not appear that a significant amount of trading occurred
under these provisions. Email Letter from Michael Graber, Deputy Executive Secretary, Secretariat for the
Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol, United Nations Environment Program to David M. Driesen
(June, 30, 1998) (on file with author). Hence, while commentators are correct to state that some legal
precedent exists for joint implementation under the climate change treaty, little significant practical
experience with emissions trading resulted.
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